THE EVIDENT APPROACH OF A WAR;

And Something of

The NECESSITY *of* It,

In Order to

Eſtabliſh PEACE, *and Preſerve* TRADE.

Pax Quæritur Bello.

To which is Added,

An Exact PLAN and DESCRIPTION of the BAY and CITY of GIBRALTAR.

The SECOND EDITION.

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THE PREFACE.

THREE Things in this Work ſeem to call for a Word or two of Preface; but I ſhall be very Brief.

1. *The Unreaſonableneſs of our Impatience to know the Certainty of things before our Governors thought fit to explain them, call'd aloud for ſome Reproof.*

2. *The Apprehenſions ſome People were under, or pretended to be under, for our Publick Credit, and for our Commerce in caſe of a War, Neither of which ſeem to be in the leaſt Danger, call'd (as loud) for* ditto.

3. *The Officious Entring upon this Subject, tho' ever ſo well intended, ſeems to call for ſome Apology.*

The Author thinks the two firſt are ſufficiently defended in the Manner of reproving them, and adds nothing to it for that Reaſon;

Reaſon; and for the Laſt, as he has taken all poſſible Care to give no Offence, and that the whole Tenour of the Work is evidently calculated for the Honour, Intereſt, and Service of His Majeſty, and the whole Britiſh *Nation, and perfectly abſtracted from all private Views or Deſires, He humbly hopes, no Slip of the Pen, if ſuch ſhould be, tho' he has with the utmoſt Care guarded againſt that alſo, ſhall be miſconſtrued to his Prejudice.*

THE

THE *Evident* Approach *of a* WAR, *&c.*

CHAP. I.

A ſhort Introduction; with a Remark upon the Impatience of ſome People to know before-hand whether we ſhall have Peace *or* War. *The Reaſon of their uneaſy Haſte; and ſomething of Who the People are. Alſo an Enquiry whether our Stocks and Publick Credit ſhould not Riſe, rather than Fall, upon the Proſpect of a War.*

WHEN all the Politicians of the Town are conſulting their Oracles upon this Important Subject, and that the firſt Queſtion in all Converſation is, *Peace* or *War*? I hope if I may not give my own Opinion, I may be a little merry with thoſe that do.

Indeed, if we go to the Merit of the Caſe, I cannot ſee why every *Britiſh* Freeholder may not claim a Right to talk of it, and enquire a little into it, modeſtly, and as becomes them; ſince in moſt Caſes that I meet with, if any Body has a Right to enquire into the Rate of a Thing, 'tis thoſe who pay for it.

War and Peace in *Great Britain*, are, notwithſtanding all our Privileges, in the Breaſt of the King; 'tis a Branch of the Prerogative; no Body diſputes it; and I ſuppoſe 'tis the Prerogative of moſt of the Kings of *Europe* alſo, and ſo 'tis meet it ſhould be.

Let the Kings (Name a' God) make a War or a Peace,
Let 'em Fight, or give o'er, as their Majeſties pleaſe.
Let's be anxious no more, whatever's our Doom;
Tho' we Fight all the World, let's be Eaſy at Home.

Leaving then the Superficials for the Superficial to refine upon, let us ſee what it is the Town is ſo reſtleſs about. For my Part, I don't ſee the People I ſpeak of, half ſo much concern'd about the Thing it ſelf, as about their not knowing it *before-hand*; a certain Hint of their Meaning; which is, in a Word, that they want to make a Bubble of it, and that be-

fore it begins too. Who may be bubbled by it when it comes, is a Queſtion by it ſelf.

And how unaccountable is this Impatience among us? Why cannot the Town be eaſy, and let things go on in the ordinary Courſe? If a War is for our Advantage, 'twill be good News when it comes; if not, bad News comes faſt enough. Let us have Patience; we muſt hear of it in the End, or Taxes muſt be lighter than uſual in like Caſes.

But there is a Figure in all this Speech; More intended than is expreſs'd: How happens it elſe that thoſe People are moſt concerned to be at a Certainty about a War, who are like to have the leaſt Hand in it when it comes? *Latet anguis in herba.*

If a War was juſt now Declared, the People who are thus eager with their Enquiries, may appear to have no manner of Concern in it, one way or other. *They are always moſt buſy who have leaſt to do.*

In a Word, the preſent Haſte we are in to know what ſhall be, is not a meer Curioſity and Impatience, but 'tis a Bite; they want to be the firſt in the Secret, and to know it before their Neighbours, for Uſes and Purpoſes; and theſe Uſes and Purpoſes are worth our Inquiry after.

Some are of Opinion, and I among the reſt, that the Curioſity of the Times ſhould not be ſatisfy'd; and that much is to be learnt, tho' perhaps not ſo much to be got, by the State of Uncertainty Men are in at this Time: At leaſt this is to be learnt, that People *within Doors* ſee what Fools we are *without Doors*, to think we underſtand them.

Stateſmen always gain by being ſecret: If they have nothing at all upon the Anvil, ſay nothing, or mean nothing when they ſpeak, they always paſs for Politicians when they are Private; and we will have it that they are wiſe Men when they are doing nothing, tho' it be only becauſe they have nothing to do.

But why are we *without Doors* ſo impatient to know what perhaps no Body here can tell us? and why do we not enquire where it is to be known? Is this the Place for the Queſtion to be ſtarted in? Or is *Madrid* and *Vienna* the proper Center of the Intelligence?

Who do we ask? And why do we talk of it here? 'Tis plain his Majeſty has reſolved, if poſſible, to preſerve the Peace. If 'tis to be a War, I think you ſhould ask the King of *Spain*, the Emperor, the *Czarina*, and thoſe Heroes of War the *Poles*, who talk of Fighting as if the World durſt not look them in the Face. Happy! *Strangely Happy!* is this Age, that the only Nations that ſeem eager for a War, are thoſe that are

leaſt

leaſt able to carry it on; and thoſe that ſeem forwardeſt for Fighting, are thoſe that when they come to it, have been always forwardeſt to run away.

To hear the *Spaniards* talk of fitting out Ships of War, and the *Poles* of raiſing Armies! I muſt confeſs, if I were to ſpeak freely upon the Subject, and any Man who I thought worth an Anſwer ſhould ask me Whether we ſhould have a War with theſe *Spaniards* and *Muſcovites*? I ſhould anſwer, *ſome little Articles excepted*, 'I am afraid not.

To hear the *Poles* threaten the King of *Pruſſia*; talk of his doing Homage to them for Part of his Country; reject the Memorials of the Proteſtants, and order their Troops (their Invincible Poltroons) to march to the Frontiers; methinks 'tis of a Piece with the Orders of their late Dyet, to diſpoſe of two Millions of *Poliſh* Florins, when 'tis ſaid they have but 40000 in their Exchequer.

Then, as I ſaid, to hear the *Spaniard* talk of fitting out 50 Ships of War, when all *Spain* is not able to furniſh 3000 Seamen; to hear of their furniſhing the Emperor with three Millions *per Ann.* by way of Subſidy, when they can't bring home their Plate Fleet from Abroad, for fear of eight Men of War, and can hardly borrow 200000 Crowns in all their Seven Kingdoms at Home; Theſe are merry Things it muſt be allow'd, and fit for little elſe, in my Opinion, but to be laugh'd at.

To hear from the *Baltick*, that the *Czarina* has order'd her Fleet to be fitted out Early in the Spring, when ſhe has lately let us ſee, that if 20 *Engliſh* Men of War appear, they dare not look abroad: And then, for fitting them out EARLY, that's another Jeſt too, as if they could get out before we could get in; or that they could Sail over the Ice, and put to Sea when their Ports are frozen up. For my Part, I can hardly believe they talk ſo at *Petersburgh*; I think they can never be ſo ſilly. I am rather of Opinion our News-mongers make it for them; juſt as they did the other Day the *French* laying up great Magazines at *Luxemburgh*, which is a City in the Hands of the Emperor, one of the Barrier Towns. The *Muſcovites* can no more come out into the Ocean without our Leave, or without fighting our Fleet, and beating it too, than their Ships can fly over the Mountains. If they deſign ſuch things as are talk'd of, and to come into the Ocean with a Fleet, they muſt change the Scene of their Marine Affairs, and go and build Men of War at *Arch-Angel* or in *Nova Zembla*, and then they may indeed go to Sea without Interruption; but 'till they do that, they may ceaſe concerning themſelves in the Na-

val Affairs of *Europe*; and if they do it, they will be little more than laugh'd at.

These are the terrible People to whom we should go with our Important Question, and of whom we should so submissively ask whether they please to give *Peace* or *War* to the so much weaker Kings of *France* and *Great Britain*. *Why should we not ask of them that know*?

It is true, they are scarce worth our Notice in the Case before us; and that, in my Opinion, makes the Question about *Peace* and *War* the less Important; and our Impatience about it seems the more Enigmatick. What mighty Haste are we in? and what great Stress do we lay upon a War with such People, as (Heaven knows) are hardly worth the Question; and who, as the *Turks* said once to the *Muscovites*, *hardly knew how to make War, and were not worth making Peace with.*

But to bring all this home to our Selves, and look into the Inside of Things with our Eyes open, and the Mists of Art cleared a little up; and so talk something gravely to it: If the Enemies which we are like to have upon our Hands, *supposing a War*, are such as I have hinted at, Why all this Concern about *Peace* or *War* with them? Why so anxious to know things before-hand? Why so much Noise about nothing! There must be more in it of one Kind, if there is not of another; it cannot be all meer Curiosity, meer *Atheniansm*; an Enquiry for meer Tittle Tattle, and for the Pleasure of a Tale.

The Case is plain, all this Part is of a mean and scandalous Original, hardly worth naming; 'tis the ALLY, and the JOBBERS, that make the greatest Part of the Noise; and they want to be answered, only that they may know how to *Put* and *Refuse*, how to *Sell out* or *Buy in*, and to make a Bubble of the War before it begins.

Now as this is in it self a Trifle not worth spending two Words about, much less to ground such a Clamour upon; a thing below Reproof, too mean for Satyr, has neither Jest or Earnest in it, and circulates between the F---s and the K---s only; beginning and ending within and among themselves; so I had not dirty'd my Fingers with it here, only to introduce a Superior Enquiry with it, and which may be of some Use to us to speak of upon this Occasion, and some others also that may follow.

This more significant Enquiry is as follows:

"Why should the Certainty of a War or of a Peace influ-
"ence the Price of our Stocks, that is to say, the Publick Cre-
"dit, one way or other?

'Tis

'Tis indeed for the ſake of this Queſtion that I mention theſe People, and begin my Diſcourſe with what would otherwiſe look ſo trifling. I muſt confeſs, if the Queſtion was put another way, I could give a more direct Anſwer to it, and ſupport that Anſwer with better Reaſons: *I mean thus*; If the Queſtion was, Whether the Certainty of a Peace or War ought to influence the Publick Credit, and the Price of Stocks, one way or other: I ſay, if this was the Queſtion, I ſhould, without the leaſt Heſitation, anſwer in the *Negative*; it ought not any way to affect the Credit or the Funds, no, not in the leaſt; and 'tis unaccountably fooliſh that it ſhould be otherwiſe.

If I ſhould incline to give it one way or other, and ſay which way ſhould the Publick Credit be moſt affected, I ſhould anſwer, That a War ſhould make Stocks riſe, not ſink them; and I ſhould value my ſelf much more upon my little Intereſt among them, in Caſe of a War, than in View of a Peace; and I may come to give you my Reaſons for this alſo, in their Place.

It is true, it paſs'd for a Maxim of War in the Time of *Julius Cæſar*, Never to deſpiſe an Enemy; but 'tis as good a Maxim, tho' not ſo Antient, Not to *Over-rate* an Enemy. *He that is afraid before he fights, will be ſure to be beaten.*

To run down our Eſtates, ſink the Value of our Funds, Sell out in a Hurry, and abate the Publick Credit becauſe of a War, and ſuch a War as this too! What is it but Fear? nay, 'tis worſe, 'tis a Fright; and without Deſpiſing our Enemy (that may be) 'tis Rating him much too high. As *Spain* is not ſo Inconſiderable as not to be worth our Preparations, ſo I am ſure it is not ſo Conſiderable as to be worth our Apprehenſions; their Power ſeems but to make the War half a Jeſt, and ſure their Threatnings and Swagger ought to be far from turning it into Earneſt.

I cannot but think there is ſome Similitude between the *Spaniards* talking of a War, and their late Prohibition of our Manufactures; they prepare for War without Money, and they prohibit Trade without Clothes.

The King of *Spain*, they tell us, forbids his People to wear any of the Manufactures of Wool or Silk, made in other Countries; and yet 'tis plain they can make none of their own; ſo that 'tis a kind of a Proclamation for the People to go naked.

Let them take away the Manufactures of *England*, *France*, and the Seventeen Provinces, and tell us, if they can, what their People muſt wear? the poor *Spaniards* may indeed be careful,

not-

notwithſtanding the Scripture Prohibition, about *wherewithal they ſhall be clothed.* Not the Prieſts have a Caſſock, not the Nuns a Veil, not the Gentlemen a Cloak, or the Ladies a Robe, I might have ſaid a Smock, but what are made of ſome foreign Manufacture. They have not one Manufacture or Material to make it of, in the whole Dominion, which we now call *Spain*, that can amount to the cloathing of the Inhabitants of one Province, nay hardly of one City.

They have Wool indeed, but by it ſelf 'tis too ſoft, too fine, and too tender to work, nor will it make any Manufacture of Value, unleſs they could get Wool of a coarſer kind to mix with it. They have a little Silk, but no Quantity. They have neither Hemp or Flax. In a Word, they prohibit the Commerce juſt as they ſeem to make War, to ſhow their Teeth, or rather to ſhow that they have no Teeth. As they have no Manufactures to ſubſtitute in the room of thoſe they prohibit, ſo they have no Ships to defend the Trade they would exclude us from.

Never Nation went to War in the Circumſtances which the *Spaniards* muſt now, if they do make a War of it; and that makes me think ſometimes they are not in earneſt, that it is all Grimace, and a kind of *Quixotiſme*; For the *Spaniards*, take them abſtracted from their particular Reſentments, were always reckoned a wiſe conſidering Nation. They have made War in former Ages, and ſometimes with Succeſs; as under thoſe truly Great Princes, the Emperor *Charles* V, and *Philip* II; and ſince that in Confederacy with ſome or other of the Powers of *Europe* that were in Condition to ſupport them at Sea: and we may ſay there was ſome Senſe in that Part; becauſe their Weakneſs at Sea being ſupported, they in ſome meaſure could preſerve their *American* Correſpondence, receive Supplies of Treaſure by their Plate Fleets, and could have the Suppport of Troops, if wanted, either by Land or by Sea; as was their Caſe in their late Wars againſt *France*; and afterwards againſt the preſent Emperor, when they were ſupported by *France.*

In the Firſt, the Confederates guarded their Flota's, and convoyed their Ships by Sea; in the Second, the *French* marched powerful Armies to their Aſſiſtance by Land; and yet in both thoſe Wars, *Spain* ſuffered ſometimes prodigious Loſſes; as in the Firſt by the *French*, in *America*, when Monſieur *Pointy* took *Carthagena*; and in the Laſt, by the *Engliſh* at *Vigo*, and the like.

But now they have not an Allie that can help them by Land, or by Sea; no not one: and yet they want to make a War! 'Tis anſwered, the Emperor is their Allie, and his Armies

are

re powerful, his Troops good, his Generals the beſt of the Age (that is to ſay, being interpreted, *ſome of the beſt*) and that e will ſupport them with all his Forces.

As to the Imperial Support, we ſhall have room to ſpeak of when we come to ſee how well the Emperor will ſupport imſelf and his own Country; but for the preſent, as it reates to *Spain*, I may take notice, that perhaps the Emperor ight ſupport, or at leaſt aſſiſt the *Spaniards*, if he knew how o come at them; but which way will that be done? and upn what Foundation does the Emperor propoſe to do it, or e *Spaniards* to expect it?

By Land it is impracticable, unleſs the Imperial Troops appointed for it could firſt fight their way from *Italy* or *Alſatia*, hro' the Heart of *France*, and ſo enter *Spain* by Land; for by ea they cannot pretend to it; the *Britiſh* and *Dutch*, and erhaps *French* Squadrons lying directly in the Way to intercept them.

At preſent *Spain* is ſurrounded on every Side by Land, ay-laid on every Side by Sea, they can neither be ſuccoured by Troops from their Friends, or ſupplied with Money from their own Dominions; and yet theſe are the People of whom we muſt enquire whether we ſhall have War r Peace; and with whom if we have a War, our Bubble-nakers pretend, the Stocks muſt fall, and the publick Funds nk in their Value! What Reaſons they can give for it, I muſt onfeſs I am at a Loſs to find.

It is true there are Facts and Events which frequently offer to our View, of which we can only ſay *they are*, not hy or for what Reaſon they exiſt; as ſome *Phœnomena* appear in the Heavens which are ſtrange and unaccountable, and f which our beſt Aſtronomers can ſay *they are*, rather than ive any Account from whence or by what Powers in Nare they exiſt; what their Motions and Revolutions are, or ow performed; ſuch as Comets, ſurpriſing Meteors, Balls or ire, and other Appearances in the Air.

There muſt be ſome *Ænigma*, ſome *Arcana*, in the Councils of that part of the World, and they muſt have ſome Dependances which we can ſee no room for, and can make no robable Gueſſes at; or elſe the *Spaniards* ſeem to be the moſt oid of Council, or their Council (ſuch as they are) the moſt void f Senſe, of any People now acting as a Nation, and in the Caacity of a Monarchy, in the World. I know nothing can be ore wonderful in the Courſe of all the Politicks of *Europe* an their preſent Conduct; nor in my Opinion can a greater rodigy happen in the World, unleſs it ſhould be to ſee them

come

come well off at laſt, which I would not Inſure under 100 *per* Cent.

Theſe things, and the abundant Patience of His Majeſty and the *Britiſh* Government, waiting the utmoſt Length of Time, trying all pacifick Meaſures, and offering beyond what the *Spaniards* have the leaſt Reaſon to expect, in order to prevail with them not to run into a War which they are in no Condition to carry on: I ſay, theſe are the only Reaſons that would perſwade me to think ſtill that it would not be a War: my Meaning is, I cannot think the *Spaniards* are ſo entirely abandon'd, ſo given up to their Piques and perſonal Reſentments, ſo blind againſt their own Intereſt and Safety, ſo infatuated and reſolved for their own Ruin, as to run headlong into a War, which in all human Probability muſt iſſue in their Loſs, if not in the utter Deſtruction of their Intereſt, and perhaps of their very Government; of which I ſhall ſay more in its order.

And is this the War that muſt ſink our Stocks! Will any Man Sell out, as they call it, for the Apprehenſions of ſuch a War as this! Let the *Bear-skin Men* that build upon that Proſpect, depend upon it, that whatever Uſe they make of the Word *War*, which I know is a formidable Word, and is of late made, as we call it, a Term of Art in their way, to run down the Price of things, and make their Game of among themſelves; yet upon the whole, it will go but a little way, and they themſelves will buy their own Stock up again in a very few Days, after they have Bubbled it out in a Fright without ground.

The many frequent Occaſions in which thoſe People have been thus taken in their own Snares, are not worth our Notice, tho' they are very well worth theirs, that they may learn to be wiſer: The Stocks which fall by this Art will never lie there, but will certainly advance with the greater Reflux, as ſoon as the firſt Judgment of ſuch a War is paſs'd; and not to make the *Spaniards* ſeem meaner and more deſpicable than they are, the little Reaſon there can be to lay any Streſs upon their Part of the War, or to raiſe any Pannicks among us from the Proſpect of it, the more aſhamed theſe People will be of having ſunk the Rate of things upon that Occaſion.

It ſeems, if this Matter was examined, that the Gentlemen who are now ſo impatient to have this ſecret Intelligence put much more Weight upon themſelves than the World may think fit to put upon them; believing that as they pleaſe to Rate their Stocks, ſo the reſt of the World ſhould Rate the War.

War is a terrible Word, and were it circumſtanced in any manner but as this with *Spain* ſeems to be, there might be ſomething of Foundation for it; But Reaſon dictates that we ſhould diſtinguiſh according to the particular People we are to engage with. Now if any good Politician will tell us what Nation in the World it could be wiſh'd we ſhould differ with rather than *Spain*; then I'll allow they might ſuggeſt a Fall of Stocks upon the Rupture.

But where is the Nation of the World that we can get more by, and are likely to loſe leſs by, in caſe of a War? In how many Places in the World are they expoſed even to our Adventurers and Letter-of-Mart Men, where they cannot defend themſelves againſt five hundred Men, and yet have immenſe Riches to loſe? How eaſie is it, not only to inſult their *Weſt-India* Colonies, but even to diſpoſſeſs them; and to take from them the immenſe Riches of *Mexico* and *Peru*?

This adds to our Wonder in behalf of the *Spaniards*, makes the Infatuation appear the more groſs, and ſeems to be ſtill a Reaſon why we ſhould think there can be no War; that is to ſay, that I think the *Spaniards* can never carry on the Jeſt ſo far. People in their Senſes never run great Hazards, where they have much to loſe; and as we know His Majeſty has taken all the wiſe Meaſures to preſerve Peace, we cannot ſuppoſe the *Spaniards* can come into a War, unleſs they are fallen under ſome National Infatuation.

For a Nation to quarrel that are not able to fight, to make a War when they are ſure to loſe by it, and have ſo much to loſe too, is a Token of inſufferable Stupidity.

For this Reaſon I would cloſe the Account thus, *viz. No War*, unleſs the *Spaniards* are mad; 'tis next to impoſſible. The *Spaniards* can never come into a War without a Blaſt upon their politick Senſe and Underſtanding; and 'tis ſtill more irrational to think, that a War with ſuch a Nation can be any Foundation for the running down our Stocks and Funds, *&c.*

As to the Advantages of a War with *Spain*, and the good Terms on which it might, and probably may, be carried on by *Great Britain*, I ſhall take that into Conſideration by it ſelf, when the Wiſdom of the *Spaniards*, and of their preſent Conduct, may be farther illuſtrated as it deſerves.

CHAP. II.

That Some may be allowed to enquire, and ſhould, if poſſible, be informed of the Approach of a War before it is begun; and that it is juſt in a Government to give them as much Information as they conveniently can.

HAving thus touch'd gently the Grounds and Reaſons of our preſent Impatience about Peace and War, and how far ſome People make a Bubble of the Enquiry, as they would do afterwards of the Diſcovery, and of the Thing itſelf; I muſt add, that after all, and abſtracting the Thing from thoſe jobbing Deſigns, which we muſt acknowledge are mean and low-priz'd enough, yet there are ſome People in the World who are juſtly concern'd to enquire, and anxious to know too, what will be the Iſſue of theſe things; and this upon a better Account, and who have very honeſt Reaſons for their Enquiries; and it is on their Account that theſe Sheets are made publick.

1. *The Merchants abroad* are concerned to make a Judgment of things: Many of theſe being ſettled in the Ports and Dominions of ſuch Princes and Powers as may be or are like to be Enemies in caſe of a Rupture, 'tis of Importance to them to have as early an Account of things as they can; that they may ſecure their Perſons and Effects in time from the Violences frequently made uſe of on ſuch Occaſions; and this may be one Reaſon why our Letters from *Spain* and *Italy* and other Parts of the World are full of importuning Enquiries about it.

2. *The Inſurers*, who are far from being an inconſiderable Body among the Merchants at home, have Reaſon to be concerned in the Enquiry; for that being to under-write Policies which are of very great Value, and inſure upon Ships and Cargoes going long Voyages, 'tis of the laſt Importance to them to know what Riſque they may run, in order to know what Premio's to take, ſuited to the Times that are to come.

As things may happen, many Ships may go out in Peace and come back in War; or they may go out in Peace, and a War break out before they arrive at the Port they are inſured to; ſo that the Inſurer knows not what Hazard he runs, or how to ſuit his Demand; nor does the Inſured know what Premio to give, any more than the other knows what to ask.

Trade

Trade ſhould not be embarraſſed with Uncertainties, or with unforeſeen Hazards. The Merchant has in all Ages been much the Care of wiſe and juſt Governors; they are a uſeful and valuable Part of the Common-wealth, and their Intereſt ſhould be regarded on all Occaſions: The Welfare of the Community very much depends upon the Safety of the Merchants and of their Effects: By them the People are employed, the Navigation encouraged, Numbers of Sailors maintained and bred up, the Revenue encreaſed, and the great Article of Commerce carried on and continued in this Kingdom.

They that venture their Eſtates and Perſons abroad, that eſtabliſh Factories, ſettle Houſes, and give Commiſſions for buying and ſelling in foreign Parts, ſhould not be kept in Ignorance and in the Dark, 'till the very laſt Moment of a Rupture. The Government will not leave them to the Mercy of the Enemies, betray them into the hands of Violence; or give them up at leaſt without a due Concern for them, and without giving them time to ſhift for themſelves, to ſecure their Effects, and to avoid the impending Storm.

3. In like caſe the *Merchants at home* ſhipping off daily large Quantities of Goods for foreign Parts, it would look particularly unkind to expoſe them to ingulph themſelves and their Fortunes in the publick Reſentment, if it may be avoided; leaving them to puſh on their Trade in Security, under the Protection of Peace, while a War is in the very Embrio, and as it were juſt breaking out; in which caſe they would often find themſelves on the ſudden ſurprized, their Eſtates confiſcated and ſeized upon, and their Factors abroad ruined and undone.

It has been uſual for Governments to give their Merchants private Hints in ſuch Caſes, not only not to run farther Hazards, not to launch out by continuing to ſhip off farther and greater Stocks of Goods, but to take care in time of the Effects they have already abroad; to diſpoſe and ſecure them, that they may not be expoſed to the Enemies; and when a Government does not do ſo, 'tis reaſonable to conclude there is really no Danger.

4. *Maſters and Owners of Ships* are concerned and may juſtly be anxious to know whether Peace or War is in the View of the State they live under, that they may man and arm their Ships in proportion to the Circumſtances of things; otherwiſe if they go out weak, and a War breaks out, they are made a Prey to Rovers and Privateers; if they go out ſtrong, and the Peace continues, they are at a needleſs Expence in

hiring more Men than they want, and laying in greater Stores than they have Occaſion for; all which eats into, or rather eats out, the Profits of the Voyage.

5. The *very Seamen themſelves* are juſtly concern'd in the Enquiry; for as, in all ſuch Caſes, the Rate of Seamens Wages bears a Proportion to the Riſques they run, and to the Dangers they may fall into; ſo 'tis a Wrong to the poor Men to ſhip themſelves at the ordinary Wages, if a War is at hand; and 'tis a Wrong to Trade to be obliged to pay advanced Wages, and conſequently Advance of Freight for Goods, in view of a War, if no War is intended.

6. *Tradeſmen at home* are concern'd to know, whether there is likely to be Peace or War, that they may know what and when to buy or ſell, when to lay in Stocks and Stores of Goods, and when not: If a War be in View, 'tis the Tradeſman's Buſineſs to ſtore himſelf with ſuch Goods as are Imported from Abroad before the Price advances, before the Hazards of War make them uncertain in their Arriving, and as well in Time as in Quantity. The *Vintner* lays in a Stock of Wines, and buys freely, that he may not be forc'd to buy in a Scarcity; the *Dyer* lays in a Stock of Cocheneal and Indigo, Gauls and Gums, that he may work as cheap as before, if poſſible, and his Merchants not go from him to another; the Country *Clothier*, if he hears of a War, lays in a Stock of Oil for his Carders and Combers, and of *Spaniſh* Wool for his fine Clothes; that if a War happens, he may not be out of Goods for the carrying on his Buſineſs, and be forc'd to buy Dearer than his Neighbours.

Again; if theſe Tradeſmen buy, if they lay in a Stock of Goods with a proſpect of War, and no War happens; if the Seller uſes Art to deceive them, and perſwade them that there will be a War, (*as is often done*) and no War follows: I ſay, theſe Tradeſmen are hurt extremely, they are clog'd with Goods, run out Stocks, got deep into Debt, and the Rate of their own Goods not at all raiſed; ſo that they are irreparably weaken'd by the Diſappointment, and ſometimes ruin'd.

Theſe things, with many of the like, juſtify the Enquiries of the Men of Buſineſs (eſpecially) into the Poſture of publick Affairs, and whether they are likely to iſſue in Peace or War; and it is in Conſideration of theſe that I enter thus into the Enquiry. As for our Friends of the *Jobbing* Buſineſs, they are a Nation by themſelves, and we have nothing to do with them in the Caſe; nor are they otherwiſe worth taking notice of, except as before.

Since

Since then there are ſome People to whom it is reaſonable we ſhould give as much Light into things as we can, Conſiſtent with the Publick Intereſt; let us for their Sakes enquire a little how things ſtand in the World, and what we may reaſonably expect, as well from the face of things abroad, as at home. Perhaps they may take ſome Light from our Enquiries, which they would not have before.

As things now preſent themſelves to our View, there ſeems to be more rational Gueſſes to be made, and a better Judgment to be form'd from Abroad, than from at Home; at leaſt as far as we may judge from the Outſides and Appearances of Publick Affairs, and as far as we are allow'd to ſearch into them, and paſs our Judgment upon them.

'Tis evident the Councils of *Great Britain* tend to Peace, if to be obtain'd with juſt and honourable Conditions: Peace, if attended with the good Underſtanding of Princes, and an agreeable Regard to the Treaties and Engagements already entered into, and ſubſiſting between the Nations, to the Advantage of all Sides, and with Support of the Laws, Religion and Liberties of *Europe*.

The Government of *Great Britain* quarrels with no body; we deſire no War, ſo that our Neighbours are not oppreſs'd, our Commerce invaded, new Trades and Correſpondencies opened, which were formerly by evident and excluſive Stipulations clos'd and ſhut up. *Great Britain* is a Trading Nation, and trading Nations never covet War. Peace is a Friend of Commerce, and Trade flouriſhes under the Banner of the General Tranquility.

But the Government of *Great Britain*, nor of its Allies, who are generally trading Nations too, muſt not be inſulted, muſt not be run down, much leſs their Commerce invaded and ſupplanted. Their Power is always exerted to protect their Trade; 'tis their Buſineſs to keep the Seas open, the Ports open, and all the Doors of Commerce open for their Merchants, and for their Ships; and, as I ſaid before, if this cannot be done by peaceable and quiet Means, they muſt do it by Force, and ſo they are as ready for War as other People.

'Tis for this that theſe Nations keep up ſuch a Military Force; ſuch Fleets and ſuch Armies to protect their Trade, to keep all the Back-doors open, to clear the Seas of Pyrates and Privateers, the Sea-Ports from Prohibitions and Reprisals, and to keep the Sea-Ports of all Nations free, and patent for their Ships, and for their Merchants; and if this be obſtructed by Force, they muſt uſe Force to repel it; if this cannot be obtained without a War, a War muſt be expected, and to me ſeems to be unavoidable. Now

Now the Queſtion before us in the preſent Caſe is very ſhort; Do the combin'd Nations, who ſeem now to oppoſe the Treaty of *Hanover*, ſeek to invade the Commerce of *Great Britain*, or do they not? Do they ſeek to undermine and ſupplant us, or no? Do the *Oſtend Company* under the Imperial Eagle, invade our *Eaſt-India* Trade, or do they not? Do they fit out Ships for Parts, which by ſeveral Treaties and Agreements they are obliged not to do, and do not uſe to fit out Ships for? Do they trade to Places whither they ought not, even by Agreement, to Trade? and is this done by Force, and with Menaces of a Continuance of ſuch Trade, and of reſenting the leaſt Oppoſition to it? If this be ſo, then I think no Man of Trade need to enquire whether we ſhall think fit to renew a War for the Recovery of the Trade, ſeeing the War is begun already by theſe Aggreſſions and Invaſions.

All the Intervals of Peace which we ſeem to have had, were obtained by the Sword. The firſt War between *Holland* and *Spain*, which held forty Years, was cloſed by the Peace of *Munſter*, in which the Rights of Commerce, as well as of Government, were all adjuſted, ſettled and determin'd, and have remained ſo peaceably ever ſince, in moſt Parts on that ſide the World. If theſe Rights of Commerce are invaded, you need ask no Queſtions about it, the War is begun there. Beſides this, the ſeveral Treaties with *Spain*, and between *Spain* and *France*, have generally adjuſted the Commerce, as well as the Poſſeſſion of the ſeveral Countries; and the ſettling of Trade has been to theſe Nations as Eſſential, as the ſettling of Peace, and was always made a Part of it.

The Conditions on which the *Netherlands* have been aſſigned to this or that Prince, have been always ſettled and adjuſted by the ſeveral Powers, with ſuitable Reſerves to Trade, ſuch as ſerv'd for a Guarantee of the Commerce on either Hand: By theſe Treaties ſuch and ſuch Prohibitions have been taken off and laid on, by which the Intereſts of Trade on either of their Boundaries have been preſerv'd and taken care of.

If the Faith of Treaties is to be preſerv'd inviolable in Matters of Peace and War, in Matters of Government and Dominion, in the Rights of Poſſeſſion, and the Claims of Sovereignty, and not in Matters of Trade; why are the Affairs of Commerce, and the free Intercourſe of the Subject one with another, mention'd in theſe Treaties? Why are the Liberties and Reſtrictions of Trade ſtipulated among other things in thoſe Treaties? They are not Articles made on purpoſe to be

broken

oken; there is no Reſerve made againſt them, no Excep-
on; 'tis no where ſaid that the Breach of thoſe Clauſes ſhall
t be taken for a Breach of the Peace.

On the contrary, thoſe Articles of Commerce have all a-
ng been looked upon as Eſſential to the good Underſtan-
ng between thoſe reconciled Nations as any of the reſt,
d the Breach of them is generally one of the firſt things
mplained of.

Upon this Foot then I take the Liberty to ſay the War is
gun already; for the Enemy have invaded us, and refuſed
put a ſtop to their Invaſions. I am told that the *Spaniards*
d the *Muſcovites* both complain of the *Britiſh* Nation's being
greſſors; and that blocking up their Fleets, whether for
ar or Trade, is an actual Invaſion, that lying before their
rts is an act of Hoſtility, and that in a word the War is
gun on this Side.

I am not to enter into a Juſtification of what they ſay, but
allance it with this: Invaſion of the Commerce is as much
act of Hoſtility, ſtrictly, as Invaſion of the Land; the Li-
rties and excluſive Rights of Trade being as much a Part
the Peace, as a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities; and if our Trade be
vaded contrary to expreſs Stipulations, the Peace is broken.
s for our Squadrons appearing ready to keep the Peace,
here apparent Preparations are made to break it, it may be
mplain'd of, and they do make ſome Noiſe about it; but I
nnot ſee how they can make that Part be called an Act of
oſtility.

If the *Britiſh* Squadron lay off of *Revel*, or any where
ſe on the *Ruſſian* Coaſt, demanding an Anſwer to the En-
iries made concerning their Preparations for War, and that
ey would explain themſelves upon the Subject of their fit-
ng out a Fleet in time of profound Peace, it is no more than
hat has been uſual in all Ages, when Princes and Powers
ake Preparations of War, while their Neighbours are all at
eace with them: For Example;

When the *Dutch* in a time of profound Peace fitted out a
leet of ſixty Men of War for the Expedition of the then
rince of *Orange* into *England*, the King of *France* ordered
is Miniſter at the *Hague* to ask the Meaning of it, and to
hreaten the *States*, that if it was meant againſt the King of
England, he (the King of *France*) ſhould take it as a Declara-
ion of War againſt himſelf.

Now if it be objected that this was done by an Ambaſſa-
dor, not by a Fleet; 'tis anſwer'd, The *French* King indeed had
not a Fleet at that time, but he threatned them directly with

an immediate War, which was the ſame thing; and as ſoo as it appeared that the Deſign was againſt the King of *England*, he drew his Armies down to the Frontiers of *Holland*, and hovered about them, (the ſame thing as blocking up a Port) and at laſt took the Field publickly, and began t open War.

I might give a great many more Examples of the like, bu this is ſufficient. The Preparations for War made by th Court of *Peterſburg*, their fitting out a Fleet, and drawin down an Army to the Coaſt, gave ſufficient Reaſon to the Neighbours to ask the Meaning of it: And to what Purpoſ was an Enquiry at ſuch a Diſtance, without a Force ſufficien to act as Occaſion ſhould require, and as the Anſwer that wa to be receiv'd ſhould direct?

Had the Anſwer been Satisfactory, 'tis probable the *Britiſ* Squadron had return'd ſooner; but as the Anſwer was no ſo Satisfactory, the Fleet continued there waiting the Event and where's the act of Hoſtility in all this? I ſee nothing but wha is uſual in the ordinary Practice of Princes; much more wa it neceſſary at this time on many Accounts, too long to ente upon here.

Nor is the Reſentment which we hear of on the other Side, the leaſt Diſcovery of the good Effect of thoſe Meaſures. No doubt it was a Diſappointment to the great Deſigns of the *Muſcovite* Empreſs; put a ſtop to the Enterprizes juſt ripe to be begun, and has ſhut up all the ſecret Reſolves of the *Ruſſian* Cabinet; ſo that we know nothing of the Scheme they had laid, other than we are left to gueſs at by the Nature of the thing, and by the Apprehenſions and Jealouſies which thoſe Preparations raiſed in the Councils of their Neighbours; Some of which had certainly before now been engaged in a War with the Empreſs of *Muſcovy*, or at leaſt with the Duke of *Holſtein*, in whoſe Behalf all theſe Preparations ſeem to have been made.

As to the *Britiſh* Squadron in the *Weſt-Indies*, who block up the *Spaniſh* Plate-Fleet at *Porto Bello*, and which the Enemy complain of as an act of Hoſtility, and upon which they pretend the War is begun on this Side; the ſame Argument, and the ſame Example fully anſwer it: The blocking up the *Muſcovite* Fleet with which it was aparent they deſigned to begin a War, and blocking up the *Spaniard*'s Money, without which we know they are but ill able to begin, much leſs to carry on a War, ſeem to me to be the very ſame thing, and that with no Difference at all, except only the Variation of the Circumſtance, and calling the Plate-Fleet an Army,

an

an Alliance and a Confederacy of Armies, drawing together for a War; all which they indeed are in Effect; for Money appropriated for War, is War in Embrio, 'tis all that Fleets and Armies are, or may be ſuppoſed to be in Deſign; and it would ſoon ſhow it ſelf, had the *Spaniards* thoſe Sinews to ſtrengthen their Councils with, and to purſue the Meaſures which they have viſibly engaged in.

So that in all theſe things 'tis evident *Great Britain* has only acted by way of Prevention, and has hitherto only held the Hands of the quarrelling Powers, and ſaid to them; 'Ye ſhall 'not fall out; if ye will make Peace, be quiet, and accommo-'date things reaſonably, well and good, but quarrel you ſhall 'not, and fight you ſhall not.'

If this has been ſpoken ſomething Magiſterially, and with an Air of Influence, as if we had Power to command them to be quiet; I ſay, If it has, (I do not ſay it has) 'tis our Felicity, 'tis *Great Britain*'s Glory, that ſhe is in a Condition to enforce her Propoſals, tho' of Peace, with a hand of Power; ſeeing ſtill that Power is exerted but for the Good of Mankind, and to keep the World quiet: 'tis a kind of Imitation of Heaven, who, tho' its Pleaſure is enforc'd as a Command, yet it is ſo for the apparent Good of the World, that they can find it no Grievance to obey.

But our Enemies, they ſay, take this for an Act of Hoſtility, that the War is begun by us, and ſo conclude that they will carry it on as a War in other Places; adding, that we may depend it muſt be a War, unleſs the Reſtraint upon their Plate-Fleet be taken off; if ſo, then the Queſtion is anſwer'd, for we ſee no room to believe the Reſtraint will be yet taken off, nay I muſt grant that we can ſee no reaſon for it.

This being the true State of the Caſe, I think the People, who I ſay ſhould be inform'd, need not wait for any further Information, but may, without any Breach of Prudence, act as if a War was in View; I will not ſay Inevitable, becauſe many things may intervene, but Probable; and that ſo probable, that if they are deceived, and run any Hazards on the contrary Preſumption, it muſt be their own Fault.

CHAP. III.

Of the Parties who in Caſe of a War are like to form the ſeveral Intereſts, and in particular the Hanover *and* Vienna *Alliances.*

THE Probability of a Rupture ſomewhere or other being thus ſettled, it will be very agreeable to the Age, if we could determine where it is likely to happen; and this is our next Work: In order to which I ſhall endeavour to make ſome Judgment upon the foot of the common Obſervation only, for I pretend to no Cabinet Informations.

The trueſt way to ſtate the Caſe, is to caſt up the Account of Strength on both Sides; or, in the Terms of our Vulgar *Engliſh*, *See who and who's together.*

The Heads of the Parties ſeem to be collected under the ordinary Acceptation of the *Hanover*, and the *Vienna* Treaties.

On the Side of the *Hanover Treaty*, I ſuppoſe the following Powers either actually or publickly engaged, or expected to be ſo; as for thoſe who are ſtill intriguing on either Side, we ſhall let them alone 'till we hear farther.

Declar'd { *Great Britain.* / *France.* / The *States.*

The Kings of *Denmark*, *Sweden* and *Sardinia* } Expected, and even depended upon as certain.

The Government of *Hanover* and *Lunenburgh*, &c. certain.

The King of *Pruſſia*, not certainly known.

Portugal, *Lorrain*, *Venice*, *Genoa*, *Tuſcany* } Neuter.

On

On the Side of the *Vienna* Treaty.

Declar'd { The *Emperor*. / The King of *Spain*.

The *Czarina* } Expected, and I ſuppoſe
The King of *Poland* } depended upon, as above.

The Electors of { *Saxony*, *Bavaria*, *Palatinate*, *Cologn*, *Mentz*, *Tryers* } Expected, and as is reported actually come in.

Duke of *Parma* } Expected.
Duke of *Modena* }

The King of *Pruſſia*, as above, not certainly known.

Having thus ſtated the Powers, it would be natural to examine a little the Occaſion of the ſuppoſed Differences, and which, in caſe of a War, may in ſome ſenſe be called the Quarrel.

As to any Private or Perſonal Piques and Reſentment which may add to the Grounds of the Quarrel, and may give Jealouſies on either hand among the Princes concern'd, tho' I might take notice of ſeveral almoſt among them all; ſuch as the ſending home the *Infanta* of *Spain*, eſpouſing King *Staniſlaus*, the Affair of *Thorn*, the eſpouſing the Duke of *Holſtein*, the Succeſſion of *Tuſcany*, with ſeveral others nearer Home, which I could enter into the Debate of, I purpoſely omit them here; being, as is ſaid before, reſolved to give no Offence; and as I am ſpeaking without Doors, I ſhall confine my ſelf to ſuch Things as Preſent to common Obſervation only.

The ſecret, and at that time ſurprizing Alliance, clapt up on a ſudden, between the Courts of *Vienna* and of *Spain*, and which is therefore call'd *the Treaty of Vienna*, was the firſt thing that gave Umbrage to the Proteſtant Powers of *Europe*; Particularly they ſeem'd to be alarm'd at ſome ſecret Articles which were not at firſt made Publick, or communicated to them, when the reſt of the Treaty was notified by the Miniſters of the Parties concern'd.

Upon the publiſhing this Treaty, and the ſaid Powers of *Spain* and *Vienna* appearing buſily employ'd to engage other Powers to come into it, as an Alliance or Confederacy; his *Britanick* Majeſty, being then in *Germany*, thought it time alſo to

draw together the ſeveral Powers in other Intereſts, to form an oppoſite League or Alliance; which Alliance is ſaid to be wholly Defenſive, and therefore entirely Pacific, being form'd merely in order to balance the ſaid Treaty of *Vienna*; and this is called the Treaty of *Hanover*; into which the Neighbouring Powers mention'd above, were invited to join alſo.

The firſt and moſt pointing Clauſe, which appeared in this new-concerted Alliance or Treaty of *Vienna*, and which gave Umbrage to the ſaid oppoſite Powers, was a conceded Liberty of Commerce granted by *Spain* to the Subjects of the Emperor, to carry on a Trade to the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-Indies*; not only injurious to the ſeveral Nations of *Great Britain*, *France*, and the *States-General*, but directly contrary to, and inconſiſtent with, ſeveral ſolemn Treaties and Conventions actually ſubſiſting between thoſe ſeveral Powers, and on the Conditions of which the Emperor enjoys the Poſſeſſion of the Country, in which this Liberty of Commerce is made uſe of.

This the Members of the ſaid *Hanover* Alliance inſiſt, is an Invaſion of their Rights, and a manifeſt Breach of the ſaid ſubſiſting Treaties and Conventions; and have not been wanting in all poſſible, tho' yet peaceable Applications, at the Court of *Vienna*, in order to convince his Imperial Majeſty that the ſaid Commerce, and particularly the *Oſtend* Company, erected and carried on in conſequence of that conceded Liberty, is a Breach of the Publick Faith engaged in thoſe Treaties, and an Invaſion of the Rights and Properties of the ſaid Powers, and repreſenting that they could not on any Terms conſent to its being carried on.

Theſe Applications have been hitherto in vain, or at leaſt unſucceſsful; both the Courts of *Vienna* and *Spain* refuſing to yield to the juſt Demands of the *Hanover* Allies; they at the ſame time ſeeming rather to reſent, than comply with thoſe Demands, and to arm and draw together their Intereſts, ſtrengthning themſelves by farther and farther Alliances, and carrying on already a kind of War of Negotiation, in order to appear formidable, and to be really ſo in caſe of a Rupture; menacing the Allies with their intended Attacks of ſome of the ſaid *Hanover* Allies in *Flanders*, in *Germany*, or in the *Baltick*.

Theſe things have juſtly moved the ſaid *Hanover* Allies to Arm alſo both by Sea and Land; and not only by powerful Fleets to appear at the ſeveral Ports where ſuch Powers have been drawing together to carry on their Deſigns, but have, by the Awe of thoſe Fleets, kept the ſaid Powers from making

making any Attempt, and from breaking the Peace by the Invaſion of their Neighbours, as they moſt certainly deſigned to do.

On the other Hand, a Squadron has been ſent to the Coaſts of *America*, as well to bring off the Ships which are, in the Faith of former Treaties, Trading within the Dominions and in the Ports of *Spain*; as to put a Stop, for the preſent, to the *Spaniſh* Plate-Fleet coming away. And all in purſuit of the ſame Pacifick Meaſures; that *Spain* ſeeing how impracticable it is for them to carry on that Important Commerce, without a good Underſtanding with the more powerful Nations of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Holland*, may be prevail'd with, if poſſible, to continue their Peaceable Diſpoſitions, and preſerve the General Tranquility of *Europe*.

How far theſe Steps, which have been viſibly taken to prevent a War (not to Excite it) have been Succeſsful, and how they are reſented by the ſeveral Powers, whoſe Deſigns are probably croſs'd and defeated by them; and whether thoſe Powers, being convinc'd of the Neceſſity of Hearkning to peaceable Propoſals, are likely to comply; or whether pretending to be Inſulted and Injured by thoſe Meaſures, they breathe out Reſentment, Revenge and War; this is what lies before us to Enquire.

And here, as I profeſs to be ſpeaking as *without Doors* only, I muſt content my ſelf to ground all the Reaſonings and Inferences which I ſhall make uſe of in this Diſcourſe, from the publick received Reports of Things; at leaſt, ſuch as are confirmed by repeated Advices, are generally received for Truth, and have not as yet been Contradicted or Diſputed; without pretending, or indeed having any Occaſion to pretend, to Secret Intelligence, Private Information, or knowing any thing which ſhould not be known.

Nor in the Caſe before me is there any Occaſion for enquiring into Secrets, or looking farther than to what appears. For, to do Juſtice to the *Hanover Allies*, they ſeem to be above all Diſguiſes in the Caſe. They are Acting above Board; and the World is left to judge of the Reaſon and Juſtice of their Proceedings. The Matter is Short, and Open. They deſire Peace; that is evident by the Meaſures they have already taken to preſerve it. They are content with every thing ſtanding upon the ancient Foot. They demand that the ſubſiſting Treaties and Conventions be duly Executed; and upon this they Inſiſt. If it be quietly comply'd with, Peace is the Conſequence: If not, *Pax Quæritur Bello.*

And

And this is the Reaſon, why (as I ſaid before) this is not the Place for the Impatient People to have their Queſtion anſwered. If they ask us here, Whether Peace or War? We Anſwer, with the Story in the Goſpel, The Emperor is of Age, *Ask him*: The King of *Spain* is of Age, *Go and Ask him.* They are to decide the Caſe; for the Offer of Peace is to them. And, as they may accept it if they pleaſe, they are the only People that can tell whether they will accept it (*'till they are Box'd into it*) or no.

Not that this is like to be long the Caſe neither, nor is it reaſonable it ſhould be ſo; for if they ſtand out too long; if they reject the Peace, while it is a Peace ſubſiſting, and ſuffer or leave Things to come on to Extremities; when once that Peace is broken, and they have pull'd the Houſe down upon their Heads, they muſt get out of the Rubbiſh as they can: The Allies are not oblig'd to give them the ſame Terms at laſt; or to ſtand always Tendering and Offering the Peace, when they may have been put to Five or Ten Millions *Sterling* Expence, to beat them to it. *But of this in its Place.* I return to the Point in Hand, *viz. The Preſent Face of Things*, as they appear to be, and as by the uncontroverted Accounts from all Parts we believe them to be.

1. The *Britiſh* Squadron under Sir *Charles Wager* have been in the *Baltick*; they have paſs'd by *Denmark*, ſhewn themſelves to *Sweden*, and, as it may be call'd, have block'd up *Revel* and *Petersburgh*, 'till the Seaſon for Action being over, the *Muſcovites* can do nothing on that Side.

2. By this Aggreſſion, all the mighty Deſigns of the *Czarina*, Empreſs of *Muſcovy*, which (as Fame ſays) were very Conſiderable, and would have broken the Peace of Chriſtendom, have been Interrupted and Diſappointed. Her embarking an Army in Aid of the Duke of *Holſtein*, to recover his Dominions from the *Danes*: Her ſending, or, as ſome ſay, Selling a Squadron of Men of War to the *Spaniards*, to ſtrengthen their Naval Power: And her other Nameleſs Deſigns, whatever they were, have been all render'd Abortive. Her Majeſty's Navy, however Formidable, or talk'd up as if they were ſo, have been Aw'd, kept in Port, and been able to do nothing; no, not ſo much as to go home again to *Cronſlot*, 'till the *Engliſh* Fleet thought fit to come away, the Seaſon for Action (as above) being over. All this we allow to be true in Fact; and the Conſequences have appeared as viſible as the Thing it ſelf: For, Peace, in all thoſe Parts of the World where the War was likely firſt to break out,

at, has been Preſerv'd; the *Danes* are ſecur'd in the Intereſt f the *Hanover Treaty*; and the *Swedes* brought off from e other Side, when it was ſuppos'd they were juſt upon the oint of Engaging in the Treaty of *Vienna*; or in an Alliance ith the Emperor, little better than the other.

How the *Muſcovites* will proceed in Conſequence of this ranſaction; whether the *Czarina*, made ſenſible how utter- uncapable ſhe is to carry on any of her vaſt Deſign, for di- rbing the Peace of *Europe*, will comply, and come into e Pacifick Offers of the *Hanover Allies*: Or whether her ajeſty, full of Reſentment and Anger, at being thus over- wered, will ſtruggle (however vain) to purſue her firſt De- ns; that remains to be diſcovered by Time. And there (as aid) our impatient Enquirers muſt go, with their Queſtion out *Peace* or *War*. Her *Czarian* Majeſty *is of Age, ask her.*

I cannot but put one Speculation here into the Hands of ur Politicians, upon this Subject of the *Muſcovite* Fleet, d let them conſider of it. The late *Czar* had rais'd his aval Power, conſidering its Beginning, and the few Years has been in Being, to a kind of a Prodigy.

A *Muſcovite* Fleet, a Thing the World never heard of be- re, ſeemed to appear in the *Baltick*, like a Comet in the aſte or Starry Spaces; or like the new Star in *Caſſiopeia*'s Chair, r all the World to wonder at. That ſuch a Thing was ne- er heard of before, is moſt certain. The whole *Muſcovite* mpire never were Maſters of one Ship of War before; no, or, notwithſtanding the vaſt Extent of their Dominions, had e *Czar*, or any of his Anceſtors, ever one Ship they could all their own, in any Part of the World, that I have ever eard or read of, except at *Arch-Angel*.

It was but in the late King *William*'s Time that the *Czar* imſelf turn'd Ship-Carpenter, and work'd Journey-work for e *States-General*. Having in Diſguiſe (ſo Hiſtory aſſures s) Enter'd himſelf in ſome of the Building Yards in that Country; Work'd hard; Earn'd his Pay; and Receiv'd his Wages.

There he bought the firſt Ship he ever had; and now they alk of a Royal Navy, Ships of 80 to 90 Guns; and of ringing out 50 Men of War of the Line. In a Word, nei- her the *Swede* or *Dane* are able to look them in the Face. Nay, 'tis doubted, whether both together wou'd venture it, f the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* were to ſtand and look on.

And yet all this while (which is the Thing I mention it or) it is not yet tryed, to this Day, whether, notwithſtand-

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ing all their Ships, they dare Fight, or no. Nor do I find, or can learn, that whether Separately, or Together, they ever yet Fir'd one Broad-ſide in Earneſt, ſince they had a Ship.

That they were at firſt well Mann'd, when the Ships were but few, is very certain; and they had Seamen of all Nations in their Pay. Their Ships were Commanded by *Dutch*, and *Scots*, and *Engliſh*; and moſt of their Officers were ſuch alſo. But now the Number of their Ships is increas'd, and they have Seamen of their own, ſuch as they are: But how they will behave, or whether they have either Skill or Courage to Fight, none yet knows. And the World cannot but be a little Curious to know how it would be. It is indeed my Opinion, they would make but very ſorry Work of it. But 'tis ſtrange, that no Accident ſhould happen in all this Time, to give them an Occaſion to ſhow, whether they can Fight, or not, and what may be expected of them! Time alone muſt give us the Experiment, and make the Diſcovery. But this is a Digreſſion.

3. Another *Britiſh* Squadron, under Admiral *Hoſier*, being diſpatch'd in the very Critical Juncture of the *Spaniards* expecting their Galeons, has been ſent to the Gulph of *Mexico*; and ſhewing themſelves on the Side of *Cuba*, and near the *Havana*, ſtood over to the *Iſthmus* of *America*, and to *Porto Belo*, Poſting themſelves at the Iſlands call'd the *Baſtimento's*, a Road which commands the Entrance into *Porto Belo*. Here the Galeons were Unloading, and here they were to take in Twenty-ſix Millions of Pieces of Eight in Specie, beſides other Goods: The ſaid Galeons are ſtill block'd up in that Port, and cannot put to Sea; to the inexpreſſible Mortification and Diſappointment of the *Spaniards*; who, for want of that Treaſure, are in no Condition in *Old Spain* to carry on their ſecret Deſigns, pay their promis'd Subſidies to the Emperor; and, in ſhort, kindle the Flame of War in *Europe*. *May they be ſtill ſo diſabled.*

4. At the ſame Time, a Third Squadron, ſaid to be intended to the *Mediterranean* Sea, has been kept Cruiſing and Plying, off and on, upon the Coaſt of *Spain*; and is now at *Gibraltar*, ready to Intercept (if it comes in their way) the other Plate Fleet, or the other Part of the Plate Fleet; which, coming from *La Vera Cruz*, with Fifteen Millions of Silver more, is arriv'd at the *Havana*. But having Intelligence (as we ſuppoſe) from *Europe*, have landed that Treaſure there, and laid by the Ships, not thinking fit to venture any farther; By both which Incidents, the *Spaniards* are depriv'd of the Return of Forty Millions of Pieces of Eight in Bullion, and about

about Five or Six Millions in Merchandiſe. And thus ſtand Affairs on the Side of the *Hanover Treaty*.

Let us now look a little on the other Side. And how does the *Vienna Treaty* or Party proceed? How do they take all theſe Diſappointments? And what are they like to do, as to Peace or War, upon the Reſentment?

In their Endeavours to ſtrengthen themſelves, by other and farther Alliances, they have not been Idle, that muſt be granted; they have not been wanting to themſelves. If we may believe what their own People acknowledge, they have left no Stone unturn'd to draw off, if poſſible, the Court of *France* from the *Hanover Treaty*; and to prevent the King of *Sardinia* joyning in with it; but have miſcarry'd in both. The Firſt of theſe ſeems to be the greateſt and moſt eſſential Diſappointment of all the reſt; and which abundantly ſhows, how Impracticable it is, to bring the Intereſts of *France* and the Empire, or of *France* and *Spain*, to Unite together. No, notwithſtanding a Prince of the Houſe of *Bourbon* enjoys the Crown of *Spain*, uninterrupted, and in full Peace. *But that by the way.*

This Attempt, as it was of the utmoſt Importance to the Imperial Court, ſo I ſuppoſe I may obtain your Belief, when I ſay the Popiſh Clergy have not been wanting to uſe their utmoſt Intereſt at the Court of *France* in favour of it; and, if poſſible, to bring the Councils of *France* to favour the Happy Juncture (as they call it) of bringing about a Religious War; and for bringing the two Treaties of *Hanover* and *Vienna* to be entirely a *Proteſtant* Alliance, and a *Popiſh*; that ſo the Article of Religion might have been brought in, as the chief Matter to be Fought for.

But they have not been able to do it, tho' a Church-man ſits at the Head of Affairs in *France*, and a Cardinal is their Prime Miniſter. So true is the modern Proverb in *France*, That *All the* French *Fools are dead.* So apparent is it, that tho' the *French* are, as a People, not only *Papiſts*, but have been Perſecutors; yet, as a Government, they are no Slaves to the Church.

That the King of *Sardinia* is as good as loſt to them alſo, appears by the *Imperialiſts* Arming in the *Milaneſe*; Fortifying *Novara*; and ordering 20000 Men to be drawn together upon the firſt Notice; which (as they write from thence) will advance, as ſoon as they have a certain Account of the King's having Signed the Treaty of *Hanover*.

It might have been of Uſe here, to take Notice, How much it would be to the Advantage of the *Vienna Alliance*,

if they had been able to have drawn off the King of *Sardinia*. But this is a Subject too tedious for this Tract. I hear, however, that the Court of *Vienna* exclaim loudly at the great Ingratitude (as they call it) of that King, who, *they say*, owes his Crown and particularly the Deliverance of his Capital City of *Turin*, to the *Imperialists*; that These travers'd the whole Breadth of *Italy*, in that Glorious March of the Imperial Army, to raise the Siege; and gave the *French* the greatest Overthrow they ever receiv'd in all the War, except *Blenheim* only; and all to save Him from Imminent Destruction, which had been otherwise Unavoidable. But I shall reserve that Part to an Article by it self; when I may have Occasion to speak of the Gratitude of Princes, for Favours receiv'd; and of *Imperial Gratitude*, among the rest.

Nor shall I enter here into the Measures taken by the Court of *Vienna*, to bring off (if possible) a certain Powerful *Protestant* Prince, from the Alliance of *Hanover*; in which, 'tis nois'd, that they have had at least some Prospect of Success. But this Part being not yet so publick, or so perfectly known, nor the Particulars of their Success (whatever it is) so Visible, either in Fact, or in Consequence, as it is probable they may soon be, I refer it to Time.

That the *Imperialists* have engaged the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologn*, and the Elector *Palatine*, and are not in doubt of *Saxony*, may, for ought we yet see, be true: And the Alliance of those Princes (especially of Two of them) are not Inconsiderable. But 'tis as certain, that the Motions even of the best of those Princes (if not of all the rest) depend so much upon *Spanish* Money, which seems at present very remote, that the Success of those Things seems very Doubtful upon that Account. And even the Emperor, however Powerful, may find it difficult to Act in a vigorous Manner, for want of those Sinews of War, which they expected from *Spain*.

Were all these Things duly Weigh'd, and fairly and impartially Judg'd of, common Reasoning would seem to tell us, there could be *no War* in View; that the *Imperial* and *Spanish* Councils could not be so Weak, so Infatuated, and so Blind to their true Interest, as to run themselves into a War, so surrounded with Difficulties; and against Enemies so perfectly well Furnish'd with every Thing that these want; so full of what they are so empty of; and so ready for Action, tho' so willing to have Peace.

But, What will not Pride and Passion drive Men to? And how Deaf are even the wisest Princes and States, to the Importunities

portunities of their own Circumſtances, when their Ambition and their particular Paſſions hurry them on?

Under all the Preſſures, which 'tis apparent the Principal Branches of the *Vienna* Alliance are embarraſs'd with, and notwithſtanding all the Difficulties they ſtruggle with, yet we ſee them Haughty; Menacing the other Allies, raiſing Forces, Filling up their Regiments, Storing Magazines, Drawing Troops to the Frontiers; and, in a Word, (as it is uſually expreſs'd) Talking of nothing but War.

Their Generals are Named for the Command of their Armies, in ſeveral Places where they are to Act; as in *Flanders*, *Italy*, and (as ſome ſay) at *Gibraltar*. The Emperor demands a new Levy of 6000 Men, ſay ſome Accounts, 10000, ſay others, of the States of the Lower *Auſtria*; and mentions the Occaſion of it; namely, to Oppoſe the Deſigns of thoſe that would diſturb the Peace of his Dominions; that is to ſay, to maintain the *Oſtend* Trade, and the Alliance with *Spain*. And thus ſtands the Caſe on the *Imperial* Part of the *Vienna Alliance*. We ſhall ſee more of it preſently.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Adverſe Powers falling upon the Britiſh *Commerce. That Invading our Trade, is Invading our Property; breaking the Peace: And ſo the War may be properly ſaid to be begun. A Word or two, how Weak, and Fooliſh, the Attempts this way are; and how eaſy it is to Diſappoint them.*

THE Politicks of the Powers mentioned above, in Forming their Intereſts and Alliances, have been mention'd; and, in that Part, they may be ſaid to Act with ſome Council. If they had acted with the ſame Prudence, in ſome other Parts of their Meaſures, I am of Opinion we ſhould indeed have had no Quarrel at all; that is to ſay, they would have given the Allies no Occaſion of a War; no, notwithſtanding their New *Vienna Treaty*.

But that which more particularly calls for our Attention, in the Conduct of theſe Powers, is their falling upon Trade, and the *Britiſh* Commerce in particular. And this, tho' they

are able to do but little in it, to any Purpoſe, or at leaſt have done but little in it yet; I ſay, this ſhows the reigning Diſpoſition among them, to inſult, injure, and affront his Majeſty, and his Allies, and wound their Intereſt in every Place where it is Valuable; ſo (if poſſible) to retaliate what they call our Interrupting their Commerce at *Porto Belo*.

In Proſecution of this weak Project (which ſeems, indeed, as fooliſh as it is forward) they have mutually made ſome little Eſſays. I ſhall mention the Facts firſt, and then the Views of the Contrivers; their Expectations from them, and the Meaning of them, ſo far as they may be allowed to have any Meaning; which I think indeed will appear very Empty and Weak, and unlikely to Succeed, or anſwer their End.

The firſt Step was made by the Emperor, in Prohibiting the Sale of the *Engliſh* Manufactures at the Fair of *Meſſina*. As to the generous Part of this Piece of Management, it had, indeed, ſomething very Extraordinary in it; particularly that the Emperor, that very Emperor, for whoſe Service and Aſſiſtance his Majeſty ſent an *Engliſh* Squadron, to drive away the *Spaniards*, and to keep the Sea clear, for his recovering the ſame City of *Meſſina*, and that whole Iſland; which *Engliſh* Squadron continuing in that Part of the World ſo long, and at ſo great an Expence of the *Britiſh* Treaſure, made way for the Conqueſt of *Sicily*; and without which the *Spaniards* would never have been Beaten out of it: I ſay, that the ſame Emperor ſhould be the firſt of all the Princes of *Sicily*, that ſhould prohibit the *Engliſh* Commerce there, and fall upon the Trade and Intereſt of his Benefactors!

Nor could there be any Pretence of the Subjects Benefit, in this Prohibition. No *Sicilian* or *Italian* Manufacture had been ſubſtituted in the Room of the *Engliſh*; or which the *Engliſh* could be ſaid to be Injurious to. Nor was any ſuch Reaſon given, or pretended to be given, for it, that I have yet met with; or any Other; only, That ſuch was his Imperial Majeſty's Pleaſure.

On the contrary, even the Subjects themſelves Remonſtrated againſt it (as I have been Informed) as prejudicial to their own Commerce.

The farther Prohibition of the *Engliſh* Manufactures in the Imperial Hereditary Countries, and Proclaimed by Sound of Trumpet at *Lintz* and *Vienna*, tho' it has the ſpecious Pretence of being done in Favour of their own Manufactures, and at the Requeſt of a Company Eſtabliſhed by the Emperor, for carrying on the Woollen Manufacture there; yet it manifeſtly

feſtly pointed at the Commerce of *England* in general; ſeveral Manufactures being mentioned in the ſame Prohibition, which their own Company do not pretend to make, or to make any other that can ſerve in their ſtead; as appears by the Remonſtrances of the Merchants and Tradeſmen of the neighbouring Provinces in his Imperial Majeſty's Dominion, made publick with the other.

But to leave theſe things, which, as I ſaid, are as weak and impotent as they appear to be piquant, and as I might ſay, malicious; we come next to the King of *Spain*'s Grant of a Trade to the Emperor's Subjects to the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-Indies*; a Trade which the *Spaniards* have, 'till now, been ſo jealous of, that they have with great Strictneſs excluded all other Nations from it: But now as an Introduction to this Trade, they have ſet up an *Eaſt-India* Company at *Oſtend*, who have already carried on a Trade to *India*, and even to *China*, to the manifeſt Prejudice of the Allies; and this in a Country conquered for the Emperor by the Arms of thoſe very Nations which are now injured by it: and which Trade is expreſly contrary to and inconſiſtent with all the Treaties and Conventions upon the foot of which the Emperor enjoys the Dominion of thoſe Countries, and of the very Port of *Oſtend* it ſelf.

Will any Man ask, after this, whether theſe Powers acting thus, intend a War? Invading our Commerce, is invading our Property; eſpecially where the excluſive Right to that Commerce is expreſly ſtipulated; and invading a Nation's Property is a War begun. As Treaties of Peace commence in Amity and Accord between Nations who were before at War, ſo avowed Breaches of thoſe Treaties put an end to that Amity, and, *ipſo facto*, commence a War.

It is true, in moſt Treaties of Peace, and where a continued Amity is deſigned, there is uſually a Clauſe mentioning, that if any caſual Contravention of thoſe Articles ſhall happen on either ſide, on Complaint made, Commiſſioners on both Sides ſhall meet to ſettle and adjuſt the Grievances, and Satisfaction ſhall be made; ſo that ſuch Contravention ſhall not be deemed as a Breach of the Peace, or any Repriſal be uſed, unleſs the ſaid Satisfaction be firſt deny'd.

But have not frequent Repreſentations, Memorials, and Complaints been made at the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* againſt this open Infraction of a Treaty, without being able to obtain any Redreſs? but on the contrary, ſeveral haughty Expreſſions been heard of, as if the Emperor was at Liberty to invade any Part of the Commerce of his Neighbours, and to break in upon the moſt ſolemn Treaties and

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Conventions, in what Manner and at what Time he pleases; and, as may be ſaid, take the Bread out of the Mouths not of private Perſons only, but even of Nations and incorporated Societies of Trade, at whatever Expence and Hazard thoſe Societies and Companies have been eſtabliſhed?

This Method ſeems to leave the Allies no other Remedy but that of Force. Trading Nations are obliged to defend their Commerce. If others pretend to interrupt it, theſe think themſelves engaged to enquire into thoſe Interruptions, and remove them. If the Doors of our Commerce are ſhut, we muſt open them; if it is done by rigorous Uſage of our Merchants, new Impoſitions or Prohibitions, the Government always has thought fit to eſpouſe the Merchants, preſerve them from injurious Treatment, and to concern themſelves to obtain Right to be done; and have, as we may ſay, made the Caſe of their Merchants their own.

We had an Example of this lately, in the preſent Reign, when an *Engliſh* Merchant at *Liſbon* (betrayed by his Agents and Servants there) was ſeiz'd upon, and his Goods confiſcated, or ordered to be ſo, for a particular Affair of Exporting Money; and tho' the Offence was indeed, ſtrictly ſpeaking, Capital by their Laws; yet, as many of the Effects of Merchants here in *England*, who were innocent of the Fact, were ſtopt among the reſt, and the Perſon there was a Man of Worth and Conſideration, and of a good Character; and eſpecially as it ſeemed to affect the whole Commerce, His Majeſty was pleaſed to interpoſe, and procure the Enlargement of the Merchant, and the diſcharging of the Effects: And the King of *Portugal* liſten'd to the powerful Interceſſion of the King, and paſſed over the thing; notwithſtanding, as I have ſaid, it was a real Offence.

Much more in other Caſes, when the whole Commerce is ſtruck at, Trade loaded with new Burthens, new Impoſitions, and Difference made between the Subjects of one Nation and the Subjects of another: The Governments whoſe Subjects are ſo diſtinguiſhed in thoſe Oppreſſions, have always thought themſelves concerned in the Invaſions of their Trade, and have eſpouſed the Intereſts of their Merchants, and of the Trade, as a publick Concern.

It is alledged in this Caſe that every Prince or Government has a Right to govern their own Commerce, and make ſuch Prohibitions, or lay ſuch Duties and Impoſts upon their Importations, as they think fit; becauſe ſuch Prohibitions chiefly regard the Uſe and Wearing of ſuch or ſuch Goods by their own People; and it is always the Right of any Government

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o limit the Uſages, Habits, Cuſtoms and Apparel of their wn Subjects.

The Anſwer to this is ſhort and direct. It is ſo, where no ormer Stipulations, Treaties and Conventions are made to he contrary; but that Right is limited, and ceaſes, when the aid Nation, ſo loading the Commerce of any other Coun-ry, have by Treaty oblig'd themſelves expreſly not to do it: Then, I ſay, and in caſe of ſuch Treaties, the Caſe alters, nd their Hands are tied up, and to do it afterward is an In-raction of the Treaty, and a Breach of the Friendſhip and ood Correſpondence eſtabliſhed between the two Nations.

This was exactly the Caſe in the late Diſputes which hap-en'd here, about opening the Trade to *France*. It was urged, hat it could not be; that *England* could not take off the igh Duties upon the Importation of Wines (in particular) rom *France*, unleſs a Proportion of the Duties upon the Wines of *Portugal* were alſo taken off; ſo as that the Duty up-on the *Portugal* Wines ſhould be ſtill ſo much leſs than the Duties on the Wines of *France*.

The Reaſon of this was, becauſe *England* was under Ex-preſs Conditions to the contrary in the Treaty of Peace and Commerce then ſubſiſting with *Portugal*; and the Articles of he ſaid Treaty of *Portugal* were produced, wherein it was expreſly ſtipulated as above, that the Duties on *French* Wine ſhould always be ſo and ſo limited; and this being found to be true in fact, was admitted as a ſufficient Reaſon why the Commerce of *France* could not be opened as was propoſed.

All Breaches of Treaties are Breaches of Friendſhip, whe-ther they relate to the Peace or Commerce of the Nations; and the Breach of Friendſhip between Nations is a kind of declaring War in many Reſpects; and nothing but meer Force and Invaſion can be a more manifeſt Breach of Friend-ſhip, than ſtopping the Intercourſe and Correſpondence of the Merchants.

Nor is this one of the leaſt, or leſs important Articles in moſt Treaties, *viz.* That there ſhall be a free Intercourſe of Trade and Correſpondence between the Subjects of either Nation; as may be ſeen in almoſt all the Treaties of Peace which have been made among the Nations of *Europe*; and it will be found ſo in a particular and extraordinary manner in all the Treaties made and now ſubſiſting between *Great-Britain* and *Spain*; and this Particular will be found in thoſe Treaties which is modern and ſingular, namely, That the Subjects of *Britain* ſhall be uſed in all the Affairs relating to Commerce, upon the ſame foot as the Nations which are moſt

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favoured. Which Article was inſerted in regard to ſome Apprehenſions that the *French* ſhould be more eſpecially and particularly favoured in the Affairs of Trade, than the *Engliſh*, and that they ſhould be diſtinguiſhed with a Partiality ſingular, and to the Prejudice of the *Britiſh* Commerce.

In caſe this Partiality ſhould be afterward put in Practice, in caſe this Correſpondence, Intercourſe and Commerce be interrupted by the Governour of that Country with whom ſuch a free Intercourſe was ſtipulated, and Prohibitions of the Trade ſet up; the Peace is ſo far broken. Suppoſe, for Example, the Importation of the *Britiſh* Manufactures in *Spain* is forbid, and the Uſe or Wearing them prohibited, which is the ſevereſt way of interrupting the Commerce; is not this equally a Breach of the good Underſtanding and Commerce of the two Nations? Is it not a Breach of the Friendſhip and free Intercourſe between them? and what is this leſs than a kind of declaring War?

It was the Obſervation of a wiſe Man, that the Peace and Friendſhip of two trading Nations ſeldom (nay he ſaid Never) continued long, where Commerce remained contraband. 'Tis like two Men pretending to Friendſhip, yet never ſpeaking to, or ſaluting, or taking notice of one another upon any Occaſion. How long will that continue? How long will ſuch Friendſhip ſubſiſt?

Our Intereſt is our Trade; and our Trade is, next to our Liberty and Religion, one of our moſt valuable Liberties; if our Neighbours pretend to ſhut the Door againſt our Commerce, we muſt open it; and that by Force, if no other Means will procure it. To invade our Commerce is to invade our Property, and we may, and muſt defend it; and therefore I ſay, to invade our Trade is to begin a War; and will any Man then ask me, whether we ſhall have *War* or *Peace*?

The Anſwer is Categorical; if they pleaſe to leave our Commerce free and uninterrupted, as they found it; lay down their interloping Companies, by which they have begun to invade it; ceaſe their Infractions of the ſolemn Treaties, and leave our Commerce open, then with ſome other Conceſſions all will be well, and I believe we ſhall have no *War*.

On the other hand, Do all thoſe things go on, ſhall they ſupport their interloping *Oſtend* Company; forbid their Subjects wearing and uſing our Manufacture; and interrupt our Commerce? As *Jehu* ſaid to the King of *Iſrael* when he met him, and asked, *Is it Peace, Jehu*? he replied, *What Peace, while the Whoredoms of thy Mother Jezabel and her Witchcrafts are ſo many*? So I ſay, What Peace, when the Encroachments

croachments on our Trade, the Interruptions and Invaſions of our Commerce are ſo many? What Peace, while the Leagues and private Confederacies are ſo many? Leagues that are ſo apparently deſtructive of Peace and good Neighbourhood; Leagues that threaten War, and are an open conſolidating of Intereſts in caſe of War; Leagues that ſupport Popery and Perſecution, and ſuppreſſing and murthering Proteſtant Subjects under Guarantee of Proteſtant Powers and Princes: Leagues that are in their own Nature tacit Declarations of a warlike Intention. What Peace can there be, while this is the Caſe?

We have ſeen frequent Examples upon many, nay almoſt upon all ſuch Occaſions, that when any Princes raiſe Forts or fortify Towns upon their Frontiers, or re-fortify Towns which have been demoliſhed by Treaties and Confederacies; that ſuch fortifying of Frontiers is taken for an Intimation of War, or at leaſt for a Teſtimony of unpeaceable and dangerous Deſigns; and the neighbouring Princes generally take Umbrage at ſuch things; ſend Agents and Meſſages to enquire into the Reaſon of them; declare their Diſſatisfaction, and threaten to uſe Force to put a ſtop to thoſe Preparations, Fortifications, and repairing of demoliſhed Places.

If the Princes and Powers by whom thoſe Fortifications are made, do not give a peaceable and ſatisfactory Anſwer, aſſign proper Reaſons for what they do, and give Aſſurances that they have no Deſign injurious to their Neighbours the Complainers, they frequently draw together their Forces, and appear reſolved to oblige them by their Power, to give over or demoliſh again the Works they had begun.

Examples of this are many, and recent in Memory; as the Fortifications which the King of *Denmark* raiſed at *Huſum*, at *Heuſden*, and other Places on the Frontiers of *Holſtein*, which cauſed the *Swedes* and Princes of *Lunenburgh* to arm againſt him, after in vain having deſired his *Daniſh* Majeſty to ceaſe his Works and leave the Country open; and this cauſed an Army of thoſe Powers to aſſemble and march to the Frontiers, in order to effect it by Force, no other Method proving effectual; upon which enſued the Treaty of *Travendhal*, where the King of *Denmark* yielded, and the Forts were immediately demoliſhed.

The like Caſe, but more univerſally known and remembred, was that of the *French* attempting to fortify *Mardike*, after the demoliſhing of *Dunkirk*, and to build a Port or Haven with Piers and Sluices there, as before at *Dunkirk*.

It was certainly juſt (and no Nation had any thing to do with it) that the *French* might, and ought to be at Liberty to build Piers and make Harbours, Docks and other things for the Aſſiſtance of their Commerce and Navigation in any Part of their Dominions, as much as the King of *England* has a Right to do it at *Dover*, or the *Dutch* at *Sluys*.

But if his Majeſty had ſtipulated by a ſolemn Treaty not to do it, I cannot ſay it would be equally rightful or juſt to do it then. So the *French* having poſitively engaged not to raiſe any Fortifications at *Dunkirk*, or to reſtore that Harbour there, or on any Part of the Coaſt near it, as was the Caſe in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, that Right to do it ceaſed, and was anticipated and taken away by the Treaty; for what any Prince or Power have bound themſelves not to do, they may be ſaid to have no Right to do.

There are many Examples of the like kind in ſeveral other Parts of the World, but theſe are ſufficient.

I might bring this home to the Harbour of *Oſtend*. I am not ſenſible that any Treaty or Convention by which the Emperor enjoys that Port, obliges him not to enlarge it, deepen the Channel, make Piers, Baſins, or any thing elſe, as ſhall appear for his Convenience, and for the Security of his Merchants and of their Ships: I ſay I do not know that the Emperor is under any Treaty or Obligation not to do this, and ſo his ordering theſe Enlargements are no Contravention of any ſuch Treaty, nor any juſt Ground of Quarrel or Jealouſy; for why ſhould not his Imperial Majeſty do every juſt thing for the Good of his People, the Encouragement of their Commerce, the Security of their Ships, and the like?

But as theſe Works at *Oſtend* are evidently deſign'd for the receiving and protecting the Ships, encouraging the Trade, and carrying on the new Company's Commerce to the *Indies*, which Trade the Emperor is expreſly bound even in the very Tenure of his Poſſeſſion not to ſupport or carry on, or to ſuffer to be carried on; then the Caſe differs exceedingly; and even the fortifying *Oſtend*, deepening and enlarging the Harbour, and the like, as mentioned above, is a juſt matter of Jealouſy; and however lawful in itſelf, yet intimates plainly, that the Emperor and his Subjects are reſolved to continue and carry on that Trade, how prejudicial ſoever to their Neighbours the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*, and however it may appear to be inconſiſtent with the Treaties and Obligations which His Imperial Majeſty is bound by, and enjoys the Country by the Stipulation of.

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It evidently ſhews a reſolved Temper, a fixed Deſign and Diſpoſition to continue that Commerce, however injurious to us their Neighbours; and that (if it cannot be otherwiſe obtained) inſtead of abating or laying it down, as was expected, and according to the Remonſtrances of the Allies, they reſolve rather to maintain it by Force; and menacing the Ally'd Powers with their formidable Reſentments, pretend to make War upon thoſe that ſhall interrupt it; as if they were able to Act in the ſame Hoſtile manner they talk of, and as if their Power was equal to their Bluſter, on thoſe Occaſions.

This is what (in our vulgar way) we call *Showing their Teeth*; and could they do no more that way by Land, than they can by Sea, it would merit ſome vulgar Talking of it. But as they ſeem to threaten the World with their mighty Forces, and that thoſe Forces are indeed Conſiderable, at leaſt are far from being Deſpicable, this is that which tells me there ſeems to be a Neceſſity of a War.

The *Flemings* talk big, and ſay, if the *Dutch* (for Example) dare to touch their Ships, and interrupt their Trade, in and to the *Indies*; the Emperor will attack them with all his Forces by Land. That I call War: and that is what I call the Neceſſity of a War. For it ſeems not to be expected, that Marine Trading Nations, ſuch as the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*, whoſe Trade to the *Indies* is ſo conſiderable, and which the Emperor is by Treaty bound not to Invade, will ſit ſtill, and ſee it Invaded and Inſulted. On the contrary, I think they will not, muſt not, cannot do it.

If then the *Dutch*, *&c.* cannot, muſt not, and will not, bear this Commerce; and the Emperor will not, cannot lay it down, and give it over; and threatens them, if they offer to interrupt it: What follows? What is the neceſſary Conſequence, but a War? Nay, What are theſe Things but a War in Effect, if not in all the Circumſtances of it? And where theſe things are Acted in this Manner, how can any Man make a Queſtion, whether a War will happen, or no?

CHAP. V.

Whether in Point of Right and Wrong we ought or may conclude, that a War ought to be the Conſequence of the preſent Councils in Europe.

IT is not the moſt difficult Thing in the World, to make a Judgment of what *may be*, by *what is:* The publick Conduct of Princes and States ſeldom ſo effectually diſguiſes their Intentions, but ſome Rational Obſervations may be made; ſome Juſt Inferences drawn; and ſome Probable Gueſſes be made, of what will be the Iſſue of their Councils.

The preſent Politicks of *Europe* are indeed more Intricate than ordinary: And yet they are not without evident, viſible Marks of the Intention that ſeveral Princes and Powers have, or had, to Break the Peace of the World, and invade the *Property* and *Commerce* of their Neighbours, in order to begin a War.

I have already mention'd, that the *Czarina*, or Empreſs of *Muſcovy*, had form'd a Reſolution to begin a War, and put an End to the Tranquility of *Europe*, by an Attempt upon the King of *Denmark*, in Favour of the Duke of *Holſtein*. I do not ſay poſitively it is ſo; but who can make any Doubt of it? To what Purpoſe were the Neighbours of that Princeſs alarm'd in that Manner? And why was the *Britiſh* Squadron ſent into the *Baltick* to prevent thoſe Attempts, if there was not ſuch an apparent Deſign? Nor (as I am told) did the Court of *Petersburgh* ſo much as endeavour to Conceal it; but rather ſollicited other Powers to Aſſiſt the ſaid Duke, in, what they call'd, Recovering his Inheritance.

Again, who can doubt the Reſolutions of the *Britiſh* Court (if poſſible) to Preſerve the Peace; keep every one in the quiet Poſſeſſion of what they held; and tye up every Side to thoſe Terms of Peace which they had already Conſented to; when they ſaw the *Britiſh* Fleet block up the Aggreſſors in their Ports, and put an End to all the violent Meaſures reſolv'd on? (A Teſtimony alſo, that ſuch Meaſures were reſolv'd on.)

As to the Juſtice of the Duke of *Holſtein*'s Claim to the Poſſeſſion of his Antient Dominions, I have nothing to do with that here: Be it Juſt, or Unjuſt, that they were taken from him; and be it Right, or Wrong, that they are kept from

from him, that is not the Queſtion to us. But as the *Czarina* Aiding the Duke with a Powerful Army, as was intended, for the Recovery of thoſe Dominions, would neceſſarily have begun a War, and perhaps embarked ſeveral Princes on both Sides, in the Quarrel; ſo far the Pacifick Powers were juſtly engag'd to prevent it; and probably may exert themſelves in the ſame, or like manner, to do the like for the future; and that, not only there, but any where elſe where they find the like Occaſion.

Not that *Great Britain* ſhould be always at the Yearly Expence of ſuch a Fleet, to keep the *Muſcovite* Fleet within Bounds, and to preſerve the Peace of the *Baltick*: But it is to be ſuppos'd, that the *Swediſh* and *Daniſh* Powers being United, they may at length join their Fleets, and be in a Condition to match the *Muſcovite* Fleet, and Command the Sea ſo, as to keep them up within their Ports, without the Aſſiſtance of their Neighbours.

From thence let us conſider the Preparations of the Impialiſts. Why ſhould I not ſay, that it is very probable they intend a War, when we have the following Account publiſhed in one of our publick Papers, ſaid to be come from the Council of the *States General*?

Hague, Decemb. 17. N. S.

" Some Days ago, the Miniſters of *Great Britain* and " *France* were invited to a Solemn Conference with the *States* " *General*; where their High Mightineſs's Deputies opened " the Diſcourſe with a Recapitulation of all the Reſolutions " taken by the States, ſince their Aeceſſion to the Treaty of " *Hanover*, that regarded the Military Preparations; to which " they added, That ſince there remained little or no Likely- " hood that the Differences between the Contending Powers " of *Europe* could be amicably Adjuſted during the Winter, " the *States* had all the Reaſon in the World to fear that the " Emperor would, in Revenge for ſuch their Acceſſion, be- " gin Hoſtilities againſt the Republick; either by Attacking it " with open Force, or by ſtopping the Payment of the Subſi- " dies, ſtipulated by the Barrier Treaty.

The Reaſon of my quoting this Speech of the *States* Deputies, is very plain, as the Speech it ſelf is very convincing in the Caſe before us. If the *States* have all the Reaſon in the World to fear that the Emperor will begin Hoſtilities with them, for their Acceding to the *Hanover Treaty*; then we have the ſame Reaſon, that is to ſay, all the Reaſon in the World, to believe a War will follow. So that there you have

have the Anſwer of the *States General* directly to this gre
Queſtion about the War.

Here is another Thing alſo advanc'd in that ſhort Speec
of the *Dutch* Deputies, which affords us ſome Foundation fo
the Arguments already uſed; where I ſeem to inſiſt That th
War is as it were already reſolv'd on, if not begun, by th
Imperialiſts and *Spaniards*, and by their interrupting and inva
ding our Commerce. The Deputies ſay,

" They have all the Reaſon in the World to fear that th
" Emperor will begin Hoſtilities againſt the Republick, eithe
" by Attacking it with open Force, or by ſtopping the Subſi
" dies ſtipulated by the Barrier Treaty.

Where, *Stopping the Payment* of ſtipulated Subſidies t
the *Dutch* Troops, is call'd a Beginning of Hoſtilities. And i
not then ſtopping the Courſe of ſtipulated Commerce, a Be
ginning of Hoſtilities? I cannot refrain ſaying, I think it is
And, *if ſo*, then I think the Hoſtilities are begun, as much a
if the Armies were in the Field, or the Fleets engag'd.

But now, as to the Queſtion, as it ſtands in Point o
RIGHT; that indeed differs exceedingly: for 'tis one Thin
to ask me, Whether *I believe* the Emperor WILL begin
War, and another Thing, Whether HE OUGHT to d
ſo, or has a juſt Cauſe to do it, *or no*.

As to the Queſtion, Whether the Emperor *ought* to begi
a War? I have two Reaſons to give, why I think not
why I think the Emperor ought not to make a War, as wel
in general, as not in particular, in this Caſe.

1. Becauſe, *in general*, no War ought to be made amon
Chriſtians, but upon juſt and unavoidable Occaſion. Ha
this War been entred upon, only in Support of a Commerc
ſet up upon unjuſt Foundations, againſt expreſs Stipulation
and againſt the Tenor of Conditions on which the very Coun
try came to the Emperor, in which he carries it on; he ra
ther might be ſaid to forfeit by this Encroachment the Righ
he had, than have a new Right to puſh on Separate Intereſts
in Prejudice of others.

2. Becauſe, *in particular*, he is under Special and Perſona
Obligations to the very Nations who are injured by this Com
merce; and that ſuch, as that to them he owes the very Poſ
ſeſſions and Dominions which he enjoys, as well in that, a
in ſeveral other Parts of the World. The *Netherlands* ma
be ſaid to be their Gift to him; they were gain'd at their Coſt
at the Expence of their Blood and Treaſure. And tho' i
might be call'd his Right, yet ('tis very probable) he had ne
ver had the Poſſeſſion of that Right, if they had not Power
fully

fully ſupported his Claim, conquer'd the Country by their Armies, put it into his Hand; and obtained the Conceſſion of *France* to it, by the Treaty of Peace concluded at *Utrecht*.

GRATITUDE binds Princes as well as private Men; Nations, as well as particular Perſons: And ſuch good Offices as theſe, can never be too much acknowledg'd, or too well requited. To ſay Kings and Emperors are not bound by ſuch Obligations, is to ſay Kings and Emperors are not or can not be Good Men, or Honeſt Men.

GRATITUDE is a Branch of *Honeſty*; and it is very hard to ſay, or even to think, a Man can be Honeſt that is not Grateful; for as *Gratitude* reſpects an Obligation paſt, or a Kindneſs receiv'd; ſo it is no more or leſs, than paying a Debt; and tho' the Debt be not ſuch perhaps as can be demanded by Proceſs (if it were, the Creditor could oblige the Debtor to Payment) yet the Obligation is the ſtronger. The Man of Honour always thinks himſelf bound faſter by the generous Kindneſs of his Friend, than by his own Bond, and will more punctually pay a Debt of Honour, than a Debt of Law.

To ſay a Prince is above all Acknowledgment, and all Returns of *Gratitude*, is to ſay a Prince is not bound by Principles of *Honour*.

Nor can Reaſons of State ballance this Principle of Honour, or the Senſe of Obligation in a Prince. The late King *Charles* II. and indeed the whole *Engliſh* Nation, left a remarkable Teſtimony of their publick Regard to this Principle of Honour upon Record, even in a National Capacity, which I cannot but mention.

After the Reſtoration, the *Engliſh* Parliament thought it convenient, for the Publick Good, to make ſeveral ſtrict Laws againſt Popiſh Recuſants; and eſpecially againſt Popiſh Prieſts, who were (on the ſevereſt Penalties) forbid reſiding here, and particularly officiating as Prieſts.

Yet not the King only, but the Parliament it ſelf, in all their Acts, made an Exception for Father *Huddleſton* a Prieſt, nay, a *Jeſuit*; in perpetual Remembrance of and *Gratitude* for his Fidelity to the Perſon of the King, in concealing his Majeſty, and aſſiſting to his Eſcape, even at the Hazard of his own Life, and in Contempt of the Reward of 1000 *l.* offered by the Enemy for the Diſcovery, after the Defeat of the Royal Army at *Worceſter*.

Here was a Teſtimony of a Nation's *Gratitude*, and of a Prince's *Gratitude*, and that even when the ſaid Nation was under the

the moſt powerful and juſt Apprehenſions of the pernicious Practices of thoſe very Prieſts, for the perverting both Prince and People to Popery; and when that Prince, as it was ſaid at laſt, was influenced ſo far as to be ſecretly reconcil'd, - - - *&c.*

But GRATITUDE never dyes, and Obligation never ceaſes; nothing can wear it out of the Mind, where the Mind is once poſſeſs'd with Principles of Honour, of Religion, and of Juſtice: A Man of Honour can no more be Ingrate, than a Man of Honeſty can Steal. Ingratitude is hardly to be expreſs'd by any Word worſe than it ſelf; and therefore 'twas the Saying of a great Man, *That to ſay a Man is Ingrate, is to ſay All of him that is Evil*: Ingratitude being a Complication of almoſt all Crimes. 'Tis a cancelling all Obligations in the Mind; and harbouring Miſchief and Reſentment, inſtead of Affection and a Senſe of Obligation.

I have heard from ſome of our Moralizing, Criticizing Friends, who are fam'd for ſearching too nicely into Nature's *Arcana*, that it is an Evil rooted in Mankind, to have an Averſion, inſtead of Affection, where they are over-loaded with Obligation. That Man, thro' a certain ſecret Pride natural to him, and introduced by the firſt Seeds of Degeneracy, conſtantly hates to be Obliged beyond his Power to make Returns.

That as long as he can balance Accounts, and while he is upon the Square, he will be an entire Friend, and act as ſuch upon every Occaſion; nay, he will be pleaſed with the Occaſion of over-paying the Debt: But when he ſees a Weight of Obligation flowing in too heavy for him to throw off, that the Debt is too great to be paid, and that he can never hope to balance the Account, he grows ſick of the Obligation; and conſequently throwing off all thoughts of Return, Hatred comes in of Courſe; for the Man hates to ſee the Perſon to whom he muſt be always making Acknowledgments.

I will not ſay how far I am or am not of this Opinion, in this Caſe; but I muſt own, that I can find out no other Way, (or at leaſt no better Way) to account for the Conduct of a certain Prince in the World; I mean as to Obligations laid upon him Perſonally, as well as in his Publick Capacity, by the *Britiſh* Nation.

I remember a ſmall Book, or Pamphlet, publiſhed in the Year 1712, Entituled, IMPERIAL GRATITUDE, drawn from a modeſt View of the Conduct of the Emperor *Charles* VI. and the King of *Spain Charles* III. with Obſervations on the Difference.

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In this Book there is a large Account of Obligations laid on his Majeſty *Charles* III. then King of *Spain*, by the late Queen and the *Britiſh* Nation; and the GRATEFUL RETURNS made by his Imperial Majeſty *Charles* VI. The former taken principally from Acknowledgments under his Catholick Majeſty's own Hand; and the reſt from the Votes and Orders of Parliament, and other Authentick Vouchers; a few of which may not be improper to be quoted in this Caſe, becauſe of ſome additional Articles which *Great Britain* is able to add to the Account, ſince the Acceſſion of His Majeſty King *George*.

It is in every one's Memory, how after the Death of *Charles* II. King of *Spain*, the Houſe of *Auſtria* and the Houſe of *Bourbon* ſeverally claimed the Succeſſion to that Crown; and how the Emperor *Leopold*, then living, cauſing his eldeſt Son *Joſeph* to Renounce, who, being then King of *Hungaria*, and King of the *Romans*, was preſumptive Succeſſor (tho' in Election) to the Empire; declared his Second Son, the then Arch-Duke *Charles*, King of *Spain*, and made Application to the Confederates (then in War againſt *France*) for their Aſſiſtance, and for placing him upon the Throne; for None elſe could do it.

Let us ſee in what humble Terms (as to his Grandſon) the good old Emperor writes to the Allies, and eſpecially to the Queen of *England*. Take it, Word for Word, from his Imperial Majeſty's own Hand. N. B. *The* Emperor *does not give the Title of* Majeſty, *but* Serenity, *to any Kings or Queens.*

" Our ſaid Son would gladly ſignifie this to your Serenity, and expreſs our Joint *Gratitude* and *Acknowledgment* of it in Perſon: But ſince the preſent Poſture of the Common Affairs calls him further, he will perform this in another Method, at his Arrival. But may it pleaſe your Serenity, in the mean time, to allow us (ſince he is to leave us in a few Days) wholly to deliver him over, and to recommend him to your Serenity as to another MOTHER, with Aſſurance on his Part, That as long as *he Lives*, he ſhall honour your Serenity with Filial Reſpect; and that our Family ſhall ever be obliged to ſerve your Serenity in the ſtricteſt Manner, and in perpetual Gratitude.

Vienna, Sept. 13. 1703.

Signed LEOPOLD.

' In conſequence of this Recommendation (ſays my Author) the young King is ſent by Land from *Vienna* to *Holland*, and paſſing from thence to *England*, we find him re-

'ceiv'd with all the Reſpect and magnificent Bounty, that 'ſuited the firſt Steps taken for his Advancement.

'He had his firſt Acceſs to the Queen at *Windſor*, *Dec.* 26, '1703. Her Majeſty receiv'd him at the Head of the Stairs, 'where his firſt Bow ſeemed (by thoſe that ſaw it) to ſignify, 'that he meant to kiſs the Ground at her Majeſty's Feet. 'Then he made the Queen a becoming Compliment, acknow-'ledging his great Obligations to her.

After this, when the ſaid King arriv'd at *Lisbon*, being complimented by Mr. *Methuen*, *Engliſh* Ambaſſador to the King of *Portugal*, ſays the ſame Author,

'His Majeſty receiv'd him very graciouſly, and expreſſed, 'in the moſt obliging Terms, the great Reſpect and Venera-'tion he hath for her Majeſty, and how ſenſible he is of the 'great and many Obligations he oweth her; which he hopeth 'he ſhould be ſo happy as to be able to return, in ſuch a man-'ner, as might ſhew the whole World the grateful Senſe he 'ſhould always retain of her Majeſty's Kindneſs to him.'

Here is Part of the Obligation acknowledged to the Queen Perſonally.

Let us follow his Catholick Majeſty into *Catalonia*, and there we find him acknowledging the ſame Things to the whole *Britiſh* Nation, and, indeed, with the ſame or greater Reaſon.

He arriv'd at *Barcelona* in *Septemb.* 1705, aided by the Confederate Forces; he Lands, takes *Barcelona*, *Gironne*, *Lerida* and *Tortoſa*; and, in a Word, the greateſt Part of the whole Principality.

In acknowledgment of the great Aſſiſtance he receiv'd from this Service, he writes to the Queen a long Letter throughout which he expreſſes his Grateful Senſe of it; but in particular, as it reſpects the whole Kingdom, as well as the Queen, he has, among others, this high Expreſſion;

"I receive ſo great an Aſſiſtance from your Majeſty and your "GENEROUS NATION, that I am overcome with your "Goodneſs, and in the greateſt Confuſion, that I ſhould be the Oc-"caſion of ſo great an Expence for the Supporting my Intereſt. And after other lofty Expreſſions, his Majeſty concludes thus;

"I am ever, with the moſt ſincere Affection, Reſpect and "Gratitude,

Madam,
My Siſter,
Your moſt Affectionate Brother
CHARLES

From the Camp at *Senia* before *Barcelona*, *Octob.* 22. 1705.

No body can ſay but his Catholick Majeſty expreſſes himſelf here like a Man of Honour, and like a Prince that had on his Mind a deep Impreſſion of what had been done.

Nor can it be denied but that as theſe Obligations were laid on him, not by the Queen only, but by the whole *Britiſh* Nation, the Debt deſcends with the Crown, and the Gratitude becomes due to His preſent Majeſty in Right of the *Britiſh* Nation; and we ſhall ſee it ſtill more plainly, when I ſhall give you the Account of the Blood and Treaſure expended by this Nation in particular, for the Service of this very Prince; where we ſhall find that it coſt *England* the Blood of almoſt ſixty thouſand Soldiers, and above eight Millions of Treaſure to ſupport his Cauſe in *Spain* only; and that even his being elected Emperor was owing to the powerful Influence of the *Britiſh* Intereſt at that time; all which are at large expreſs'd in the Tract juſt now quoted, *Pag.* 41. *as follows*, viz.

An Account of Troops as well raiſed in England *as in* Spain *and* Portugal, *for the Service of King* Charles III, *at the proper Expence, and in the Pay of* England.

The Firſt Shipping, 1703.

	Men.
Shipped from *England* with Duke *Schomburgh*	8000
Raiſed in *Portugal* at the *Engliſh* Expence	13000
1704.	
With the Earl of *Galway*	4519
1705.	
With the Earl of *Peterborough*	5000
Ditto from *Gibraltar*	2000
Recruits	750
More Regiments the ſame Year	4170
Recruits	1240
1706.	
With the Earl *Rivers*	9359
1709.	
This Year	8676
Recruits	800
1710.	
Sent to *Portugal*	8801
	66315

Beſides theſe, *England* Paid, Hired, Raiſed or Sent at their Proper Expence, the following Troops.

1706.	*Men.*
Raiſed by King *Charles* in *Catalonia* and paid by the Queen of *Great-Britain*	6000
Form'd there after the Battel of *Almanza* in *Engliſh* Pay	2800
Paid more from *Italy*	6600
1708 Sent from *Italy*, but paid by *Great-Britain*	5000
1709 *Ditto*	4000
1710 *Ditto*	4690
	29090
	66315
	95405

So that in the whole, here was ninety five thouſand four hundred and five Men actually landed in *Portugal* and *Spain*, or raiſed there, and all paid at the Expence of *Great-Britain*. Well might the King expreſs himſelf under great Obligations to this GENEROUS NATION.

Let us now ſee a Sketch of the Expence which *England* was at in particular for this Service; and this we have in the ſame Tract, *Page* 42, taken from the appropriating Votes in the ſeveral Parliaments of thoſe Years, as follows:

An Account of the Expence of the War in Spain, *as it was publiſhed in a Book, Entitled,* Imperial Gratitude, *&c.*

The Alliance with *Portugal* in Behalf of King *Charles* III. was in the Year 1703.

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Money for the Service the firſt Year, there being no Parliamentary Proviſion	162478	05	02
More added to the ſame Year, provided for by Parliament 1705	68549	19	06
1704 Allowed by Parliament for the War with *Spain*, in Defence of K. *Charles* III.	326481	11	00
Expended more the ſame Year	21659	09	00
1705 Appointed by Parliament for the ſame Service	476727	15	10
1706 *Ditto*	726740	15	10
1707 *Ditto*	998322	11	10
1708 *Ditto*	1248956	12	02
1709 *Ditto*	1217083	00	04
1710 *Ditto*	1276035	16	02
1711 } Not ſettl'd at the publiſhing that Book, 1712 } but the Author takes it by Proportion at	2075000	00	00
Total, in Sterling Money,	8183035	16	10

Theſe things, ſays the Author, would hardly ſeem creditable, were not the Vouchers ready to confirm the Particulars, and to prove every Part of them; and he adds, ‘ That after ‘ ſuch an immenſe Expence of Blood and Treaſure laid out ‘ in his Service, it would have been very Grateful and Ho‘ nourable, and perhaps but Reaſonable, that His Majeſty ‘ ſhould have written one Letter more, to aſſure Her Maje‘ ſty, He will think now of ſome Means to pay, or ſecure ‘ the Payment of, thoſe immenſe Sums which the Queen had ‘ laid out to aſſiſt him.

The ſame Book gives a particular Account of his Majeſty's being beſieged in the City of *Barcelona*, and of the Diſtreſs he was reduced to; gives Copies of the preſſing Letters which the King wrote to Her Majeſty for Succours, and the Account of the timely Deliverance obtained by the Aſſiſtance of the *Britiſh* Fleet and Troops in raiſing the Siege, and cauſing the *French* Army to retire with Diſgrace; which adds to the Account, and heightens the Obligation that his Majeſty acknowledged himſelf to be under before.

After this, the Death of the Emperor *Joſeph* happen'd; and then all the Confederates, but *England* in particular, made the moſt powerful Inſtances among the Princes of *Germany* to procure the Election of the King of *Spain*; and carried it for his Majeſty againſt all the Intrigues of the *French* Court, and the particular Application of the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologn*.

This finiſhed the Fortunes of his Catholick Majeſty, and advanced him to the higheſt Degree of Human Glory that this World can beſtow.

Let us ceaſe here a little 'till the Acceſſion of his preſent Majeſty to the Throne of *Great-Britain*, and beſides all the Obligations laid on his Imperial Majeſty of another kind, of which I have no room to enlarge in this Place, we may at once look into the Quadruple Alliance; a Treaty which, by the Intereſt and Influence of his *Britanick* Majeſty, was calculated for the particular Service of the Emperor; the King of *France* was brought to aſſiſt by his Arms to bring the King of *Spain* to hearken to Reaſon, and to come to the Terms of the Truce, and *Spain* preſſed by the Arms of *France* did conſent to put an end to the War.

Without the powerful Fleet of the King of *Great-Britain* opening the Sea to the Imperialiſts, and ſhutting it up from the *Spaniards*, defeating and taking their whole Fleet, the Imperialiſts had never been able to have taken the Kingdom of *Sicily*: So that it is to the glorious Arms of His Majeſty

jeſty that the *Spaniards* were driven out of that Kingdom, and the Emperor put in Poſſeſſion of it.

Now bring all this down to the preſent State of Things, May we not civilly examine for which of all theſe Acts of generous Aſſiſtance of the *Britiſh* Nation, I ſay for which of them it is that the Court of *Vienna*, or the Emperor, has prohibited the *Engliſh* Commerce at the Fair of *Meſſina*; the very City King *George* may be ſaid to have conquered for him; for which of them he has invaded our *Eaſt-India* Trade, and prohibited all our *Engliſh* Manufactures in the great Market of *Lintz* by Sound of Trumpet?

May we not ſay, Is this *Imperial Gratitude*? Is this a ſuitable Return to His Majeſty, and to the powerful Efforts of a Generous Nation, for the Intereſt and Honour of the Emperor? Is it what His Majeſty might reaſonably expect, or what the *Britiſh* Nation had Reaſon to look for? Or is this the Way the Princes of that Part of the World pay their Debts of Honour, and balance the great Obligations which they receive from one another? We hope we might ſay this without Offence.

Let the Language of His late Imperial Majeſty's Letters to the late Queen, to the Duke of *Marlborough*, and to the States of *Holland*, at the naming his Grandſon to the Succeſſion of *Spain*, and after the Battel of *Blenheim*; and the Language of His preſent Imperial Majeſty when ſhut up in *Barcelona*, and in Danger of being carried in Triumph to *Madrid*, be all conſidered, when he was every Hour expecting a general Aſſault, and begged of Sir *George Rook* to come ſpeedily to his Relief:-

I ſay, let theſe which are at hand to produce, and which, had I room, I could give you at large, to illuſtrate this Part, be conſidered; May we not compare them with the Terms now uſed in Return to the frequent Memorials and Repreſentations of the *Britiſh* and *Dutch* Ambaſſadors at *Madrid*, claiming a juſt and friendly Performance, not of Promiſes only and grateful Remembrances of generous and kind Actions done, but of ſolemn Treaties and Leagues; Treaties of Peace and Commerce, Friendſhip and good Underſtanding, wherein Limits of Trade as well as Dominion are ſettled and adjuſted? Let the haughty Anſwers and the Expoſtulations of Reſentment, which Fame ſays were returned by the Court of *V*----- to Memorials framed with the utmoſt Reſpect, be all Duly conſidered and compared as above, and what ſhall we conclude from it; what can we ſay! except that perhaps this is the Meaning of that hitherto Miſunderſtood Expreſſion, that difficult and doubtful Thing called IMPERIAL GRATITUDE.

From

From all which however, we may flatter our ſelves, that for the future, the *Britiſh* Nation and their generous Princes, will conſider very well how they oblige Emperors again, beyond their Power of Requital; and how they ſpend Eight Millions to ſet a Prince upon a Throne, that ſhall turn the Arms of that very Power they gave him againſt the Intereſt of his Benefactors.

But Heaven, whoſe Impartial Juſtice the *Britiſh* Nation and their injur'd Sovereign appeal to in all this, will no doubt ſoon diſcover its Sentiments of theſe things; and the Power God has put into his Majeſty's Hands can never be better employed, than to humble the Inſolence of ſuch Powers, as think themſelves above the Natural Laws of Friendſhip and Gratitude, and regard no Juſtice, but as it conforms with their Intereſt, and encreaſes their Power.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Spaniards *being Aggreſſors in the War; their Pretences, how trifling; their Power, how far from being formidable; and of what the Conſequences of a War may be, as well to them as to us.*

IF we may judge by the Appearance of Things, there are two Articles in this Forwardneſs of the *Spaniards* to Quarrel, which make it very prepoſterous on their Side.

Firſt, That they are as ill able to manage a Quarrel (with *England* eſpecially) as any Nation in *Europe*.

Secondly, They have as little Pretence to make a Quarrel of it.

1. As to their Ability to manage a War with us, I have ſpoken of it in particular already; and leſt I ſhould be told, 'tis time enough to boaſt *when we put our Armour off*, I am content to ſtay 'till then; and let the *Spaniards* count their Gain when they have had their Fill of a War, ſo I ſay no more of that now.

2. As to their Pretences, or the Cauſes of Quarrel, I can find but two; that is to ſay, all that I can meet with on their own Part, or that they ſo much as pretend to, may be reduced to two Heads.

Firſt

Firſt, The Affair of the *Britiſh* Squadron lying before *Porto Belo*; or, as they commonly expreſs it, Blocking up their Ports, and in it their Plate-Fleet.

Secondly, The *Engliſh* refuſing to reſtore *Port-Mahon* and *Gibraltar*.

As for the Firſt, they make a great Noiſe of it; complain of its being an Inſulting their Coaſt, an open Violation of Friendſhip, an Interruption of Commerce, and an Act of Hoſtility, with much more of that Kind; and upon this we are now told they draw together their Armies, Hover about *Gibraltar*, (tho' they are able to do very little to it) talk of Building new Fortifications to incommode the Bay or Port, buy Ships of War, and, in a word, ſhow by many weak Advances that they reſolve upon a War.

Certainly the *Spaniards* have very wrong Notions of their own Strength, or elſe we are ill inform'd about it; and particularly how ill able they are with all their Strength, tho' it were double to what it is, to annoy the *Engliſh*, or defend themſelves againſt us.

That they are not equal by Sea is very evident; 'tis no Boaſting to ſay they cannot look us in the Face upon the Salt-water; all the Naval Force of *Spain*, were it brought together, and had they the greateſt Liberty given them they could deſire to bring it together, could not fight a Squadron of twenty *Britiſh Third Rates*; and this I ſay is far from being a Bluſter, ſince it was proved at Cape *Paſſaro*, where the *Spaniards* had the beſt Fleet, and the biggeſt Ships that they have ever ſeen at Sea *of their Own* for a hundred Years paſt.

What then are the *Spaniards* doing? Do they reflect that *Great Britain*, *France*, and the *States-General*, the three greateſt Marine Powers in the World, are in Alliance, and may come to act in Conjunction in this War, if there was any Occaſion for it, againſt one (alas how Impotent!) ſingle Power of *Spain*? Have they conſidered what they are able to do againſt Three ſuch Powers United, the weakeſt of whom are able to blow all the Ships of *Spain* out of the Sea, and make them not dare to ſtir out of their Ports? What can the King of *Spain*, or the Council of *Spain*, think of ſuch an unequal War? and what Encouragement can their Officers and Seamen have to engage in their Service, or embark in their Ships, where they are ſo ſure to be beaten?

2. Have the *Spaniards* conſider'd, that they have a vaſt unguarded Coaſt for above a thouſand Miles lying upon the Sea, as well on the Side of the Ocean, as in the *Mediterranean*; from St. *Sebaſtian* at the bottom of the Bay of *Biſcay*, to *Viana*

Viana on the Edge of *Galitia*, and from the River *Guadiana* on the ſide of *Andaluſia*, to the Mouth of the *Straits*, and thence to the Bay of *Roſes*, on the Frontiers of *Rouſſillon*, in the Dominion of *France*.

The Length of this Coaſt is at leaſt twelve hundred Miles: Not all the Force of *Spain*, nay, ſcarce all the Men in *Spain*, were they arm'd and form'd into Regiments, could guard ſuch an extended Coaſt, ſo as that they could prevent its being continually harraſs'd and inſulted by an Enemy that is thus ſuperior at Sea; and who can appear now on this ſide, now on that, and whoſe Motions it is impoſſible any Troops on Shore can follow or obſerve.

What ſtrange Havock could the Allies, thus arm'd, and Superior at Sea, make upon the Coaſt of *Spain*? and whether they ever landed or no, their very hovering upon the Coaſt is Alarm enough to keep the whole Country waking, and hurry and fatigue their Soldiers to Death, by haſty Marches in a hot Climate; ſo that the Troops would be ruin'd as effectually, as if they had been beaten in the Field.

As to their bluſtering about *Gibraltar*, and threatning to beſiege it with twenty five thouſand Men, I may ſpeak of it by it ſelf; But let us look a little off of their Military Part, to that of their Commerce.

The firſt Attack they have made upon us there, (for there alſo they are Aggreſſors) is their publick prohibiting the wearing our Manufacture in their Country; *Prohibiting the Importation follows of Courſe*. How ill they are able to furniſh Manufactures, by the Induſtry of their own People, to ſupply the Place of ours, I have mention'd already; but let me ask the *Spaniards* a few Trading Queſtions upon this Occaſion.

Trading Nations never prohibit the Exportation of their own Goods, whether the Growth of their Country, or the Labour of their People. To Prohibit Trade with *England*, is to prohibit the Exportation of their own Growth, which by the way is the main Wealth of their Country; I mean as to its home Product: And can they live without the Trade with *England*?

Have they conſider'd what they ſhall do, if *England* finding the *Spaniards* refuſe to take off their Cloths and Stuffs, their Woollen Manufacture of all Kinds, and their other needful Exports, ſhould refuſe to take off their Wines, Brandies, Oil, Raiſins, Oranges, Lemons, Almonds, Soap, *Spaniſh* Wool? and if *France* ſhould refuſe their Wool and Iron, and all their other Produce? They need not perhaps forbid their Subjects the

wearing any Silks or Stuffs of *England* or *France*, they would be naked enough; for they would ſoon have no Money to buy them, and muſt be glad to buy Blankets and Woadmill of the *Moors* of *Africk*, to cover them.

Xeres de la Fronteira is a Place near the Coaſt, in the Bay between *Cadiz* and *Sevil*; that Country is full of Vines, and they tell us that they make ſixty thouſand Pipes or Buts of Sherrey every Year, and moſt of this is brought away by the *Engliſh*, *Dutch* and *Hamburgers*; but if the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* refuſe it, how will all that Country live? how will the Vines run wild, and be ruin'd, the People ſtarve, and have no Employment, and the Lands lye waſte?

The like is to be ſaid of their Oil and Soap at *Sevil*, of which the Quantity is exceeding great, ſo that they have one Wood oppoſite to *Sevil* nine Leagues in Circuit, all of Olive-Trees, from which they tell us they make ſixteen thouſand Quintals of Soap in a Year; but unleſs they can ſell off this Soap and the Oil to *England*, *Holland*, &c. all will be waſte, for the Quantity they can conſume at home is next to nothing.

The *Canary Iſlands* have no other conſiderable Market for their Wines but to *England*, except what caſual Ships take off, going to *Africa* or *America*; if the *Engliſh* forſake the Place, and leave off the Trade, thoſe Iſlands are undone; and the *Spaniards* themſelves have always been ſo ſenſible of this, that when there has been a War between the two Nations, the King of *Spain* has always allow'd the *Canary* Trade to be open to *England*, and to enjoy as it were a Neutrality, that their Wines may be taken off.

From thence let us go on to the South Coaſt of *Spain* in the *Mediterranean*, and there is firſt *Malaga*, a City flouriſhing and rich; the Cuſtoms they ſay pay the King of *Spain* eighty thouſand Pieces of Eight a Year for that one Port. But with whom is their Trade? I inſiſt that five Parts of ſix of their whole Trade is with the *Engliſh*; the Wines, eſpecially thoſe we now call *white Mountain*, (call'd ſo, becauſe they grow on the Sides of the Hills, on all the North Part of *Granada*) who Buys them, and where are they Drank? The *French* buy no Wines, the *Italians* buy no Wines, the *Moors* are all *Mahometans*, they drink none; none but the *Engliſh*, and perhaps one Ship or two at moſt to *Holland*. Their Raiſons, called *Malaga* Raiſins, come almoſt all to *England*; their Lemons go indeed to *Holland*, and the Neighbouring Coaſts; but three times as many to *England*, as to all other Places; and what will the Loſs of ſuch a Trade be to them? How will the Country be ruin'd, and the People ſtarv'd, if they cannot put off their Wine and Fruit?

The

The Trade at *Alicant* is much the ſame as at *Malaga*, only their Wines are richer; ſuch as *Tent*, and red *Alicant*, bought uſually to give Strength and Colour to other Wines. Their Raiſins are the beſt in the World, and are Ship'd off yearly in a prodigious Quantity; but all chiefly to *England*.

The ſame Trade continues a long way on the Coaſt of *Valentia*: Upon the *Catalonian* Coaſt there is the ſame Trade for Wines, *viz.* at *Bene Carlo*, *Barcellona*, and other Ports; but all for *England*; alſo ſome Brandy is brought from thence; and who will have the Loſs, if all theſe Wines are left upon their Hands?

It muſt be the moſt ignorant thing in the World of its kind, to have the *Spaniards* prohibit wearing our Manufactures, when they have no other to wear; and to ſtop the Trade to *England*, when they have no other Market for their General Produce.

But I return now to the Affair of a War: What is *Spain* a doing? They tell us they are drawing an Army together to attack *Gibraltar*; but do the *Spaniards* conſider two things?

Firſt, That *Gibraltar* is ſo ſituated, that it cannot be attack'd? Do they remember that the Marſhal *de Teſſe* ſent the King of *France* Word, that to continue the Siege of *Gibraltar* would but ruin the whole Infantry, and that forty thouſand Men could never take it by Land?

Secondly, Do they know, that as ſoon as they begin this Enterprize, they may expect the *French* with two Armies upon their Frontiers, one on the Side of *Catalonia*, and the other on the Side of *Navarr*? and that by drawing their Troops off to the remoteſt Angle of their vaſt Country of *Spain*, they muſt leave their Frontiers open to the *French*? and that it will be very hard to bring them back upon an Emergence, when they are at leaſt five hundred Miles off?

But we are anſwered, That 'tis a Miſtake; the King of *Spain* is not forming the Siege of *Gibraltar*, he has only ordered a Fort, or ſome Forts, to be built in proper Places, and upon his own Lands, which is no Breach of the Peace; for ſure he may have the Liberty to do what he pleaſes upon his own Lands.

We cannot give an Anſwer to this here, becauſe we do not know how far the Fact is true, and we have it yet by Report only. But this we may venture to ſay.

If the *Spaniards* build, or fortifie in the Neighbourhood of *Gibraltar*, or on the Bay, or Coaſt about it, as is reported, 'tis either to incommode the Town and Port of *Gibraltar*, or it is not; if it is not, and there is no Reaſon to take umbrage at it, or

complain of it; then I ſuppoſe we ſhall not complain of it, for *England* will certainly take no Offence, where no Cauſe of Offence is given.

But if this is done with Deſign, either to Streighten and Block up the Town, or to incommode the Navigation of the Port and the Commerce; This is in a plain Senſe an Act of Hoſtility, and can be taken for no other; and Force is not to be Complain'd of only, but to be Repell'd.

Not but that even in this, the *Spaniards* ſeem to be rather ſhowing their Teeth, than any thing elſe. Nor does it appear that they are able to do any conſiderable Injury to the Port, and none at all to the Town of *Gibraltar*.

The Bay of *Gibraltar* is at leaſt five Miles over at the Entrance, that is, from Cape to Cape; and 'tis not leſs than three or four Miles over, within the Bay, oppoſite to the Town, and where the old Town of *Gibraltar* ſtood.

The Depth of Water is ſuch, that the largeſt Ships may ride almoſt any where; and they have from 30 to 50 Fathom Water, right againſt, and near to the Entrance of the Mole, and in the Offing they find no Ground at 100 Fathom, *as appears by the Plan.* Whatever the *Spaniards* can pretend to do by Fortifying the oppoſite Shore, I leave to the Judgment of the Publick; as I do, whether they ought to be allowed to Fortify there, or no.

As to any thing they can do by Land to *Gibraltar*, I believe the Government are in no great Pain about it; only that they will take Care to put ſuch a Garriſon into it, as may give the *Spaniards* occaſion to be more appehenſive of Diſturbance from the Town, than the Town from them.

The Town is a *Peninſula*: 'tis to be attack'd no way in Form, but by that ſmall Neck of Land which joyns it to the Continent of *Spain*; and there the Acceſs to it is Naturally ſo difficult, and by the Addition of Art made ſo impracticable, that I believe the Garriſon are in no Pain about what the *Spaniards* can do that way. Upon the Whole, I may ſay of *Gibraltar*, as the *French* formerly ſaid of *Dunkirk*,

Il et une Place Terrible.

For the farther Information of the Reader, and to make what I have ſaid be perfectly Intelligible, I have here given a Plan of the Situation, as well of the Bay, as of the Town, and of the oppoſite Coaſt; by which the Reader will judge, whether the *Spaniards* Act like Men in their Senſes, or no, in pretending to attack the Place, while at the ſame Time they know they are not Maſters of the Sea, or able to hinder its being relieved as often as there is Occaſion.

CON-

The Bay of Gibraltar, with a View of the Town, &c.

A. Entrance into ȳ Bay.
B. Variation of ȳ Compass.
C. Riding for Small Ships.
D. Ditto for Men of War.
E. No Ground here at 100 Fath.
F. Road of old Gibraltar.
G. Town of old Gibraltar.
H. Road to Cadiz.
I. The Ballast River.
K. Cape Calbrita.
L. The Channel of ȳ Straits.
M M. Two small Rivers.
N. An old Tower.

1. The Town of Gibraltar.
2. The South Bulwark.
3. A New Battery.
4. The New Mole.
5. Cape Gibraltar or Europa Pt.
6. Signal House.
7. Willis's Battery.
8. New Fortifications.
9. Old Mole.
10. The great Hospital.
11. The Works rais'd by the French in the former Siege, now demolish'd.
12. A 6 Battery.
13. Redout.



Page 52.

CONCLUSION.

HAVING thus obſerved the angry impotent Diſpoſition of the Neighbouring Powers in the *Vienna Treaty*, for a War; it remains to inquire, What our Share may be in it? and what *England* has to be frighted and terrify'd at, among all thoſe Bluſters and high Words?

For my Part, I have conſidered, with all poſſible Gravity, every Part of the Thing, and I can ſee no Thunder in all theſe Clouds; the gathering Vapours may portend ſome Storm, but I don't ſee it can reach us; I wiſh other People would examine it too.

The utmoſt I can ſee in it all, is, that they may put us to ſome Expence, and that is (in its Kind) a Grievance, 'tis true; but let the *Spaniards* look out ſharp; 'tis Ten to One but we may make our ſelves whole at their Expence, one Way or other. Now and then a Galeon or two falling in our Way, may make us Amends for a whole Expedition; and we muſt have worſe Luck than ordinary, if we chop upon none of them.

In the firſt Place; Their Privateering will not give us much Uneaſineſs in our Trade; a Thing which was always our great Inconvenience in a War, either with the *French* or *Dutch*. There are but three Places which will be againſt us in this War, where Privateers of any Note are uſually fitted out.

1. The Port of *Oſtend*.

2. The *Biſcayners*, that is to ſay, the Ports of St. *Sebaſtian* and St. *Andero*.

3. The *Majorkins* in the *Mediterranean*.

The Firſt of theſe have been conſiderable, in former Wars. But will be now ſo ſurrounded (all the Ports of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Holland*, being ſhut againſt them, and all the Ships of thoſe Powers being their Enemies) that I do not ſee how they will dare to ſtir out; or if they ſhould take a Prize, how they would be able to carry it home; the utmoſt they could do, would be to Cruiſe upon the Coaſt of *Spain*, that they might have the Ports of *Galitia*, or of *Andaluſia*, for their Retreat; and that would not be ſo fatal to us, but that we might venture them there. But all our Channel Trade, Coal Trade, and Coaſt Trade, would be very quiet and undiſturb'd; which three Articles were the great Sufferers in the laſt

laſt Wars with *France*, and are generally ſo in any War with the Marine Powers on this Side of the World.

The *Biſcayans*, again, have the ſame Reſtraint, in its Degree; for as the *French* are at their Door, and our Trade lying ſo diſtant as the Mouth of the Channel, they muſt go a great way for Purchaſe, and have a long Run back again for Safety, when they take a Prize; in which Caſe, 'tis great Odds but they may be met with, by either *French* or *Engliſh*.

In the late War, when they had all the *French* Coaſt to befriend them, and could run into any of their Ports, either in Streſs of Weather, or when chas'd, or when favour'd with a good Prize, then indeed their Riſque was not ſo great, and ſometimes they made a good Hand of it. But I am much miſtaken if they will pretend to fit out many Privateers upon all the Coaſts, as the Caſe is like to ſtand with them now.

3. The *Majorkins* then are the only People left; and their Roving may be confined to the *Mediterranean*; where there are three Things to be obſerved, which makes our Trade pretty ſecure:

1. The *Majorkin* Rovers are all ſmall, they never carry above Eight, to Twelve, and Sixteen Guns, being rather Sloops, and a kind of Galley-built Veſſels, than Ships; made for nimble Sailing, and Roving alſo; and they dare not attack Ships of good Force.

2. Moſt of our Ships Trading into thoſe Seas, are Ships of good Force, and particularly in Caſe of a War, will be ſo; from Twenty-four to Thirty-ſix Guns, and will ſeldom go without Convoy neither; ſo that the *Majorkins* will very rarely venture upon them.

3. *Majorca* is ſo Situated between *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, that they will find it very hard to keep the Seas, without being intercepted by ſome of our Men of War, who will be perfectly Maſters of the Sea, and be always Cruiſing between the Straits Mouth and that Iſland; and alſo Weſtward, between the Iſland and the Coaſt of *Italy*.

Thus, I think, we need not be very anxious for our Trade, on Account of their Privateers. Some few may indeed appear in the Bay of *Cadiz*, fitted out at Port St. *Mary*, *Sevil*, S. *Lucar*, and thoſe Places, and may Cruiſe off of the Southward Cape, and the Coaſt of *Portugal*. But 'tis hoped we may have ſo good a Look-out there for Galeons, and ſuch People, that the Privateers will find but little Good upon that Coaſt.

We

We are told, indeed, that the *Spaniards* will have Privateers and Cruiſers among our Iſlands in the *Weſt-Indies*, in the Gulph of *Florida*, and on the Coaſt of *Carolina* and *Virginia*; theſe may, indeed, harbour at the *Havana*, St. *Auguſtine*, and St. *Domingo*, and have ſeveral Skulking Places on the North Side of the Gulph of *Mexico*: But as our Squadron in thoſe Seas is already very ſtrong, and likely to be ſtronger, it may be no difficult Matter to keep thoſe Seas clear; and perhaps the *Havana* may not always be a Retreat for them, as ſtrong as it is; of which more may be ſaid when a War (if it is to be a War) is actually begun.

Having thus ſtated the Caſe, as to Privateering, let us examine the other great Articles, in which the Enemy think they can wound us; and they are, I think, but two.

1. Prohibitions of Commerce.
2. Alarms about the Pretender.

1. Prohibitions of Commerce. It is true, every Prohibition of Commerce to a Trading Country, as this is, may in ſome particular Caſe or other be a Loſs, as it ſtops ſome of the Channels of our Trade, by which our great Vent of Woollen Manufacture in particular, is circulated and extended in the World. But it is alſo the particular Happineſs of our Woollen Manufacture, that the ſeveral Countries where it is carried and ſold, are generally in as much want of the Goods, or of the Sale and Conſumption of thoſe Goods which *England* takes in Return for them, as we can be of the Sale of ours; and in particular, the King of *Spain* is eminent for both theſe Circumſtances; as has been mentioned already.

The Conſequence of this has always been, that either by Connivance, or by the Interpoſition of Neutral Nations, Trade has always found private Channels of Conveyance; and the Merchants find Ways and Means to furniſh themſelves on one Hand, and diſpoſe of their Product on the other; ſo that ſuch Prohibitions ſerve indeed to make Things ſell for a better Price than ordinary, but ſeldom put a full Stop to the Trade. Were it ſo, I dare venture to affirm, *Spain* would be the greateſt Loſer by the Prohibition, beſides being far from the beſt able to bear it.

What Lengths the *Imperialiſts* may go in Prohibitions of Commerce, we yet do not ſee; but ſhould they do their utmoſt (as I ſaid above) they would do their own Subjects much more Damage than they can do us. And I appeal to the Experience of the Men of Commerce for Proof of the Fact.

Firſt,

First, Suppoſe a Stop of Commerce with *Flanders*, that is to ſay, with the *Imperial Netherlands*, which is what ſome People ſeem to apprehend.

It is true, they may ſtop the Importation of our Woollen Manufacture thither, tho' with all their Prohibitions Trade will find Vents there too, as well as it has done in *France*, and other Countries; and 'tis preſum'd, the Prohibition muſt be as univerſal as the War, that is to ſay, with *Holland*, *France*, and *Great Britain* all together; and how the *Flemings* will find their Account in that, is for them to judge, not for me.

But to ſpeak to it only as to *England*. Pray who will be the greateſt Sufferers in ſuch a Prohibition? *England*, for want of the Vent of ſome Woollen Manufacture (tho' indeed not very conſiderable) which are uſually ſent to *Flanders*? Or the *Low Countries*, for want of the Sale of their *Cambricks* and fine *Bruſſels* and *Mechlin* Lace? of both which ſo exceeding a Demand is made here, by the Humour and Fancy of our Ladies running into the Wear and Uſe of thoſe two Articles, and the Price of which is of late ſo extravagant, that the Ballance of Trade between the two Countries is evidently to the Advantage of the *Flemings*, and that in a prodigious Degree. So that I cannot but ſay, a Prohibition of Commerce between them, would be at this Time one of the kindeſt Things the Emperor could do for us, and we ſhall have no Reaſon to be ſorry or anxious about it, whenever it begins. Our only Buſineſs (at leaſt I think ſo) would be, whenever they make the Prohibition on their Side, to take care it be duly Executed on our Side.

There is but one Part of the World more, where the Emperor can make any conſiderable Prohibition of Commerce with us by Sea, and that is in *Italy*; and I am perſwaded his Council, if they are Men of Common Underſtanding in Buſineſs, will never adviſe his Imperial Majeſty to take ſuch a Step. Let us examine the Particulars briefly:

This Prohibition can only extend to the Ports of the Kingdom of *Naples*, in the Weſt and South Side of *Italy*, and the Ports of *Meſſina*, *Palermo*, &c. in *Sicily*. In return for which, he firſt of all ſtops the *Engliſh* taking off the Oil of *Gallipoli*, and then the Thrown Silk of *Naples* and *Sicily*; and at the ſame Time as he has not Power to prohibit the *Engliſh* Commerce at *Leghorn*, the Manufacture of *Great Britain* will be only carried thither, inſtead of being carried to *Meſſina* and *Naples*, and the Merchants will ſend thither to buy them; for we are aſſur'd they muſt and will have them.

In

In a Word, *Great Britain* laughs at their Prohibitions: Nor can the War, with which they threaten us, be any way fatal to our Trade, no, not in any one Place.

I might ſay ſomething here to the Stop this War might ſeem to give to the Vent of *Engliſh* Manufactures in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies:* But if I ſhould ſay, on the other Hand, that the *Spaniards* ſeem really not to know what they are doing in that Particular; and that it is more likely, if they don't conſider it in time, that *England* may open a Door there to the Commerce, which it may never be in the *Spaniards* Power to ſhut up; and that a direct Trade from *England* to *New Spain*, may be a full Satisfaction to us for all their other Attempts upon our Trade, that they either have made, or can make to our Prejudice; I ſhould ſay nothing but what I could very effectually explain

2. As to their Menacing us with the Pretender; the Damage to Trade being my preſent Subject, I ſhall ſay little to it here: It is ſo remote from them as well as from us, they are ſo little able to do any thing in it, and the Creature himſelf has ſo little in him to make him Formidable, that I think it hardly worth naming.

Yet one Thing I cannot but obſerve in this (otherwiſe inſignificant) Thing, call'd the Pretender; *viz.* That as it was in the Time of one of the greateſt *Engliſh* Monarchs who ever wore the Crown, I mean *Henry* VII, that his Enemies, whenever they had a Mind to make him uneaſy, always play'd one Impoſtor or other upon him, ſuch as *Lambert Simnel*, *Perkin Warbeck*, and the like, ſo they would do now.

Thus whenever any Foreign Power deſigns to raiſe Diſtractions among us, and to Inſult the King of *Great Britain* in any Quarter whatever, they will always play the Pretender upon us. If the King of *Spain* has the leaſt View of Reſentment depending againſt *England*, preſently the late Duke of *Ormond* comes to Court, and has an Audience of his Catholick Majeſty. And the late Earl Mariſchal, a *Scots* Refugee (and who it ſeems is in Commiſſion under the King of *Spain*) is ordered to ſet aſide his Journey to *Andaluſia*, and the like; as if by theſe remote Motions, *Great Britain* was to be Alarmed, and that it was to be underſtood, that ſomething was doing, or contriving to be done on that Side, in Favour of that deſpicable Intereſt, call'd *Jacobitiſm*.

I remember we read in the Story of *Henry* VII, That when that firſt Impoſture was Quelled, and *Simnel* (who

was play'd upon that Prince as a Pretender) fell into his Hand; inſtead of putting him to Death (as Juſtice indeed demanded) the King, to let his Enemies ſee how he contemned the Attempt, took the poor miſerable Thing and ſet him in the Royal Kitchin to turn the Spit, and lick the Trenchers, deſpiſing thereby not the Perſon only, but the Party.

The Inference I think is juſt; *England* has ſo little to fear from the Pretender, or from the Neſt of Pretenders now in *Italy*, for it ſeems there is a new Succeſſion of Pretenders in the Hands of the Pope and his Prieſts; I ſay, *England* has ſo little to fear from them, that the greateſt Contempt is to be put upon all theſe little Motions; and they ought to give us no other Alarm, than only to take care to keep Jacobitiſm down at home, to keep them in the ſame State of Mortification and Humiliation that they are already in, and then not to fear their Agents from abroad.

In a word, it ſeems to be juſt the ſame Caſe, as I have already hinted relating to *Spain:* Now tho' Jacobitiſm is not ſo inconſiderable as not to be worth our ſetting our Feet upon it, yet 'tis far from being ſo conſiderable as to make us afraid of it. No Thief is ſo inconſiderable as that we need not ſhut our Doors and bar our Windows when we go to Bed, to keep them out; but all the Thieves in the Nation are not ſo conſiderable, but that when we have faſtened our Doors, and the Watch is ſet, we can ſleep in quiet, and defy them.

Again, I muſt ſay, it is a Piece of extraordinary Kindneſs to the Jacobites themſelves, who as they are a Deluded and Impoſed upon People, call for ſome Pity from even the Government which they offend; and the kindeſt thing the Government of *Great Britain* can do for them, is to take away all their Hopes, foreclose their Expectations, and ſhow them how impoſſible the Reſurrection of their Party is, under the preſent Diſpoſitions; and how effectually every Back-Door is barred up againſt them, that ſo their Hopes being entirely deſtroyed, they may learn to deſpair, and no more precipitate themſelves into certain Ruin, in attempting to revive a Cauſe that is not to be revived.

Beſides, it is worth their while to reflect upon what Foot it is, that theſe Foreign People bring their loſt Cauſe into the Queſtion; *namely*, for nothing but to play it upon the Nation, if poſſible, in the Nature of a Diverſion, or to give an Alarm, reſerving it always in *Petto*, to give it up whenever they are reduc'd to the Neceſſity of making a Peace; and that even the

the greateſt Prince that ever eſpouſed them, ſacrificed their whole Intereſt, when he found it needful to make a Peace at their Expence.

I had purpoſed here to have enter'd into a uſeful, and a ſerious Diſcourſe, concerning the Expedition to *Porto Belo*; and the Poſting the *Britiſh* Squadron under Admiral *Hoſier*, at the Iſlands call'd *Los Baſtimento's*, on the Coaſt of the *Iſthmus* of *America*; and to have given a like Plan of the Situation of thoſe Iſlands, as I have here of *Gibraltar*, and how they reſpect the Harbour of *Porto Belo*; But as this would require alſo, that I ſhould conſider the great Advantages which lye before us in a formal and further Proſecution of that Attempt; and how *Great-Britain* in the carrying on this War, may give a new Turn to the Commerce of that Part of the World, infinitely to the Advantage of theſe Iſlands, and yet without giving Umbrage to the Allies, by making any Attempts to ſeize upon the Country it ſelf; and that I purpoſe to handle that Subject by it ſelf, as ſoon as the publick Affairs diſcover themſelves, ſo as to make it acceptable; for that Reaſon, and alſo, becauſe I have not room to ſpeak effectually to it here, I refer it to another Occaſion.

F I N I S.